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Abstract
We discuss an ongoing line of research in the relational (non topological) semantics of non-
distributive logics. The developments we consider are technically rooted in dual characterization
results and insights from unified correspondence theory. However, they also have broader, conceptual
ramifications for the intuitive meaning of non-distributive logics, which we explore.
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1 Introduction
The term ‘non-distributive logics’ (cf. [10]) refers to the wide family of non-classical propositional logics
in which the distributive laws α ∧ (β ∨ γ) ⊢ (α ∧β )∨ (α ∧ γ) and (α ∨β )∧ (α ∨ γ) ⊢ α ∨ (β ∧ γ) do not
need to be valid. Since the rise of very well known instances such as quantum logic [52], interest in non-
distributive logics has been building steadily over the years. This interest has been motivated by insights
from a range of fields in logic and neighbouring disciplines. Techniques and ideas have come from pure
mathematical areas such as lattice theory, duality and representation (cf. [68, 27, 48, 1, 61, 47, 47, 43, 34],
and more recently [28, 36, 25, 55, 56, 24, 44, 45, 46]), and areas in mathematical logic such as algebraic
proof theory (cf. [5, 31, 11]), but also from the philosophical and formal foundations of quantum physics
[8, 38, 10], philosophical logic [63] theoretical computer science and formal linguistics [50, 37, 53].
The present paper discusses an ongoing line of research in the relational (non topological) semantics
of non-distributive logics. The developments we will consider are technically rooted in dual character-
ization results and insights from unified correspondence theory [23, 20, 19]. However, they also have
broader, conceptual ramifications for the intuitive meaning of non-distributive logics. Specifically, the
slogan from the title, ‘from semantics to meaning’, intends to convey the idea that, not dissimilarly from
the conceptual contribution of Kripke frames to the intuitive understanding of modal logics in various
signatures, the relational semantics of non-distributive logics can help to illuminate what these logics
are about at a more fundamental and conceptual level than what the technical insights, constraints and
desiderata typically yield. For instance, a natural question is whether relational semantics of (some) non-
distributive logics can provide an intuitive explanation of why, or under which circumstances, the failure
of distributivity is a reasonable and desirable feature; i.e. whether a given relational semantics supports
one or more intuitive interpretations under which the failure of distributivity is an essential part of what
‘correct reasoning patterns’ are in certain specific contexts. Perhaps even more interestingly, whether
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relational semantics can be used to unambiguously identify those contexts. Such an intuitive explanation
also requires a different interpretation of the connectives ∨ and ∧ which coherently fits with the interpre-
tation of the other logical connectives, and which coherently extends to the meaning of axioms in various
signatures.
The starting point and background of the present paper is the theory of those non-distributive logics
which arise as the logics canonically associated with varieties of normal lattice expansions (cf. Section
2), i.e. algebras based on general lattices with additional connectives of any finite arity, which satisfy
certain finite-distributivity properties coordinate-wise. Throughout the paper, these logics will be re-
ferred to as normal LE-logics, or just LE-logics. By their definition, LE-logics are presented via their
algebraic semantics; however, relational semantics for LE-logics in any signature can be introduced by
a process of dual characterization which pivots on well-known adjunctions and representation theorems
[7, 61] complete lattices. In Section 4, we illustrate the dual characterization methodology in detail, and
apply it to obtain the definitions of two relational semantic frameworks for LE-logics: the polarity-based
frames and the graph-based frames. Although polarity-based and graph-based semantics are tightly con-
nected and arise from the application of the same methodology, they give rise to two radically different
intuitive interpretations of LE-logics: namely, the polarity-based semantics supports the interpretation
of LE-logics as logics of formal concepts (and consequently, of specific LE-signatures such as those of
lattice-based normal modal logics as e.g. epistemic logics of categories and concepts); the graph-based
semantics supports a view of LE-logics as hyper-constructivist logics, i.e. logics in which the principle
of excluded middle fails at the meta-linguistic level (in the sense that, at states in graph-based models,
formulas can be satisfied, refuted or neither), and hence their propositional base generalizes intuitionis-
tic logic in the same way in which intuitionistic logic generalizes classical logic. Consequently, we will
argue that graph-based semantics supports the interpretation of specific LE-signatures such as those of
lattice-based normal modal logics as e.g. epistemic logics of informational entropy). All this is discussed
in Section 4.
In the present paper, we will only scratch the surface of a broad research program, and hint at the ex-
istence of an extremely rich conceptual and technical landscape. Rather than giving an exhaustive survey
of the existing results in the relational semantics of non-distributive logic, we focus on: (a) highlight-
ing the methodological aspects involved in the definition of the relational semantics for LE-logics; this
methodology can be applied also to different semantics than the ones discussed in the present paper (and
it would be very interesting to discover which possibly different interpretations of LE-logics are sup-
ported by other semantics), and (b) substantiating the claim that relational semantics for non-distributive
logics can bring the same types of benefits that Kripke semantics has brought to modal logic, both from
a technical point of view (concerning results such as the finite model property, correspondence theory,
transfer results driven by Go¨del-McKinsey-Tarski-style translations, Goldblatt-Thomason-style charac-
terization theorems, semantic cut elimination) and from a conceptual viewpoint, concerning the extent to
which these logics are suited to model a range of situations and phenomena. Finally, the picture already
emerging from the preliminary account presented in this paper suggests that, similarly to what happens
in the case of modal logics, many important results and insights can be obtained in complete uniformity,
also across different types of relational semantics, so that various proposals and solutions developed for
specific signatures (e.g. Routley-Meyer semantics for substructural logics) can be systematically con-
nected and extended to other signatures.
2 LE-logics
Informally, LE-logics are the logics of (varieties of) lattice expansions: for disjoint sets of connectives
F and G , a lattice expansion (abbreviated as LE) is a tuple A = (L,FA,G A) such that L is a bounded
lattice, FA = { fA | f ∈ F} and G A = {gA | g ∈ G }, such that every fA ∈ FA (resp. gA ∈ G A) is an
n f -ary (resp. ng-ary) operation on A. We say that an LE is normal if every fA ∈FA (resp. gA ∈ G A) is
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coordinatewise either monotone or antitone, and preserves finite (hence also empty) joins (resp. meets)
in each monotone coordinate and reverses finite (hence also empty) meets (resp. joins) in each antitone
coordinate. Henceforth, since every LE is assumed to be normal, the adjective will be dropped. An LE
as above is complete if L is a complete lattice, and every fA ∈FA (resp. gA ∈ G A) preserves arbitrary
joins (resp. meets) in each monotone coordinate and reverses arbitrary meets (resp. joins) in each antitone
coordinate.
For any algebraic LE-signature as above, the set of formulas of the language LLE := LLE(F ,G )
over a denumerable set Prop of proposition letters is defined recursively as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ⊤ | ϕ ∧ϕ | ϕ ∨ϕ | f (ϕ) | g(ϕ)
where p ∈ Prop, f ∈F and g ∈ G .
Example 2.1. The language LBi of bi-intuitionistic logic [62] is obtained by instantiating F := {> }
and G := {→}. Both connectives are binary, and are antitone in the first coordinate and monotone
in the second one. The language LIL of intuitionistic logic is the {> }-free fragment of LBi. The
language LDML of distributive modal logic (cf. [35], [18]) is obtained by letting F := {♦,⊳} and and
G := {,⊲}; all connectives are unary, and ♦ and  are monotone while ⊳ and ⊲ negative. The
language LPML of positive modal logic [26] is the {⊳,⊲}-free fragment of LDML. The language LBiML
of bi-intuitionistic modal logic [69] is obtained by instantiating F := {> ,♦} and G := {→,}. The
language LIML of intuitionistic modal logic [30] is the {> }-free fragment of LBiML. The language
LSDM of semi-De Morgan logic (cf. [65]) coincides with the language of Orthologic [38] and is the
{♦,,⊳}-free fragment of LDML. The language LFL of the Full Lambek calculus [51, 32] is obtained
by instantiating F := {e,◦} with e nullary and ◦ binary and monotone in both coordinates, and G :=
{/◦,\◦} with /◦ (resp. \◦) binary and monotone in its first (resp. second) coordinate and antitone in its
second (resp. first) one. The language LLG of the Lambek-Grishin calculus (cf. [54]) is obtained by
letting F := {e,◦,/⋆,\⋆} and G := {
e,⋆,/◦,\◦}. Here
eis nullary, ⋆ is binary and monotone in both
coordinates, and /⋆ (resp. \⋆) binary and monotone in its first (resp. second) coordinate and antitone in
its second (resp. first) one. The language LMALL of the multiplicative-additive fragment of linear logic
(cf. [32]) is the {⋆,/⋆,\⋆,/◦}-free fragment of LLG.
In what follows, we will mainly focus on LE-signatures the ‘expansion’ part of which consists of
unary connectives, and take them as our running examples throughout the remainder of the paper (see
[41, 20] for a treatment of arbitrary signatures). The basic framework is given by the basic normal non-
distributive modal logic L := LLDML , defined as the smallest set of sequents ϕ ⊢ψ in the language LDML
of distributive modal logic, containing the following axioms:
• Sequents for propositional connectives:
p ⊢ p, ⊥ ⊢ p, p ⊢ ⊤,
p ⊢ p∨q, q ⊢ p∨q, p∧q ⊢ p, p∧q ⊢ q,
• Sequents for modal operators:
⊤ ⊢⊤ p∧q ⊢(p∧q) ♦⊥ ⊢ ⊥ ♦(p∨q) ⊢ ♦p∨♦q
⊤ ⊢⊲⊥ ⊲p∧⊲q ⊢⊲(p∨q) ⊳⊤ ⊢ ⊥ ⊳(p∧q) ⊢⊳p∨⊳q
and closed under the following inference rules:
ϕ ⊢ χ χ ⊢ ψ
ϕ ⊢ ψ
ϕ ⊢ ψ
ϕ (χ/p) ⊢ ψ (χ/p)
χ ⊢ ϕ χ ⊢ ψ
χ ⊢ ϕ ∧ψ
ϕ ⊢ χ ψ ⊢ χ
ϕ ∨ψ ⊢ χ
ϕ ⊢ ψ
ϕ ⊢ψ
ϕ ⊢ ψ
♦ϕ ⊢ ♦ψ
ϕ ⊢ ψ
⊲ψ ⊢⊲ϕ
ϕ ⊢ ψ
⊳ψ ⊢⊳ϕ
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3 Polarity-based and graph-based semantics of LE-logics
In the present section, we discuss two types of relational semantics for LE-logics, starting with the com-
mon methodology used to define them, both for specific LE-signatures [36, 12, 14] and for arbitrary ones
[20, 41, 22]. This methodology uses adjunctions involving complete lattices to define the interpretation
of LE-formulas on relational structures by ‘translating’ their interpretation on algebras by means of a dual
characterization process on which we expand and exemplify in the next subsection (cf. also discussions
in [23, 20]). The resulting semantic environments are those we discuss below and in the appendix.
3.1 Polarities, reflexive graphs and complete lattices
Polarities and representation of complete lattices. A polarity [33] is a structure P = (A,X , I) such
that A and X are sets and I ⊆ A×X is a binary relation.
For every polarity P, maps (·)↑ :P(A)→P(X) and (·)↓ :P(X)→P(A) can be defined as follows:
B↑ := {x ∈ X | ∀a ∈ A(a ∈ B→ aIx)} and Y ↓ := {a ∈ A | ∀x ∈ X(x ∈Y → aIx)}. The maps (·)↑ and (·)↓
form a Galois connection between (P(A),⊆) and (P(X),⊆), i.e. Y ⊆ B↑ iff B ⊆ Y ↓ for all B ∈P(A)
and Y ∈P(X).
A formal concept of P is a pair c = ([[c]],([c])) such that [[c]] ⊆ A, ([c]) ⊆ X , and [[c]]↑ = ([c]) and
([c])↓ = [[c]]. It follows immediately from this definition that if ([[c]],([c])) is a formal concept, then
[[c]]↑↓ = [[c]] and ([c])↓↑ = ([c]), that is [[c]] and ([c]) are Galois-stable. The set L(P) of the formal concepts
of P can be partially ordered as follows: for any c,d ∈ L(P),
c≤ d iff [[c]]⊆ [[d]] iff ([d])⊆ ([c]).
With this order, L(P) is a complete lattice such that, for any X ⊆ L(P),
∧
X = (
⋂
{[[c]] | c ∈X },(
⋂
{[[c]] | c ∈X })↑)
∨
X = ((
⋂
{([c]) | c ∈X })↓,
⋂
{([c]) | c ∈X }).
This complete lattice is referred to as the concept lattice P+ of P. Moreover,
Proposition 3.1. For any polarity P= (A,X , I), the complete lattice P+ is completely join-generated by
the set {a := (a↑↓,a↑) | a ∈ A} and is completely meet-generated by the set {x := (x↓,x↓↑) | x ∈ X}.
Proof. Every formal concept is both of the form c = (Y ↓,Y ↓↑) for some Y ⊆ X and of the form c =
(B↑↓,B↑) for some B⊆ A. Since Y =
⋃
{x | x ∈ Y} and B=
⋃
{a | a ∈ B}, and (·)↓ : P(X)→P(A) and
(·)↑ :P(A)→P(X), being Galois-adjoint, are completely join-reversing, [[c]] =Y ↓ =
⋂
{[[x]] | x ∈Y}=
[[
∧
{x | x ∈ Y}]] and [[c]] = B↑↓ = (
⋂
{([a]) | a ∈ B})↓ = [[
∨
{a | a ∈ B}]], as required.
The following theorem is a converse to the proposition above.1
Theorem 3.2 (Birkhoff’s representation theorem). Any complete lattice L is isomorphic to the concept
lattice P+ of some polarity P.
Proof. Let P := (L,L,≤), where L is the domain of L and ≤ is the lattice order. Then it is easy to see
that the formal concepts of P are of the form ((
∧
X)↓,(
∧
X)↑) for any X ⊆ L, and since L is complete,
the assignments a 7→ (a↓,a↑) and ((
∧
X)↓,(
∧
X)↑) 7→
∧
X define a pair of order isomorphisms between
L and P+.
1For every partial order (X ,≤) and every x ∈ X , we let x↑ := {y ∈ X | x≤ y} and x↓ := {y ∈ X | y≤ x}.
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Reflexive graphs and representation of complete lattices. A reflexive graph is a structure X= (Z,E)
such that Z is a nonempty set, and E ⊆ Z×Z is a reflexive relation, i.e. ∆⊆ E , where ∆ := {(z,z) | z∈ Z}.
From now on, we will assume that all graphs we consider are reflexive even when we drop the adjective.
Any graph X = (Z,E) defines the polarity PX = (ZA,ZX , IEc) where ZA = Z = ZX and IEc ⊆ ZA×ZX is
defined as aIEcx iff aE
cx iff (a,x) /∈ E .
The complete latticeX+ associated with a graphX is defined as the concept lattice of PX. Conversely,
for any lattice L, let Flt(L) and Idl(L) denote the set of filters and ideals of L, respectively. The graph
associated with L isXL := (Z,E)where Z is the set of tuples (F,J)∈ Flt(L)× Idl(L) such that F∩J=∅.
For z∈ Z, we denote by Fz the filter part of z and by Jz the ideal part of z. Clearly, filter parts and ideal parts
of states of XL must be proper. The (reflexive) E relation is defined by zEz′ if and only if Fz∩ Jz′ =∅.
3.2 From algebraic to relational semantics
In the present subsection, we discuss how the adjunctions outlined in the previous subsection can be used
to define an interpretation of the propositional language of general lattices on polarities and reflexive
graphs, starting from the standard interpretation of this logic on complete lattices. The same method will
be applied to define polarity-based and graph-based semantics for any LE-language LLE = LLE(F ,G )
from complete LLE-algebras, via the adjunctions above, suitably expanded to account for the interpreta-
tion of the additional connectives, in a uniform and modular way.
This method stems from the observation that interpretations on complex algebras and satisfaction
relations on frames correspond to one another along the adjunctions outlined above.
Let L be the propositional language of the logic of general lattices. In what follows we will abuse
notation and identify the logic with its language. Let us briefly recall how the correspondence between
interpretations on complex algebras and satisfaction relations on frames works in the Boolean and dis-
tributive settings.
In the Boolean and distributive settings, for any partially ordered set F = (W,≤) (in the Boolean
case, ≤ coincides with the identity ∆W ), and any satisfaction relation  ⊆ W ×L between elements of
F and formulas, an interpretation v : L→ F+ can be defined2, which is a lattice homomorphism, and is
obtained as the unique homomorphic extension of the equivalent functional representation of the relation
 as a map v : Prop→ F+, defined as v(p) = −1[p]3. In this way, interpretations on complete lattices
can be derived from satisfaction relations, so that for every w ∈W and every L-formula ϕ ,
w  ϕ iff w≤ v(ϕ), (1)
where, on the right-hand side, w∈ J∞(F+) is the completely join-irreducible element4 of F+ arising from
w ∈W . Conversely, for any such F, any lattice homomorphism v : L→ F+ gives rise to a satisfaction
relation ⊆ W ×L defined as in (1). Instantiating condition (1) according to the syntactic shape of each
formula in L, we obtain the familiar satisfaction conditions of L-formulas in the distributive setting; for
instance, the satisfaction clause of ∨-formulas can be obtained as follows:
w  ϕ ∨ψ iff w≤ v(ϕ ∨ψ) definition of  as in (1)
iff w≤ v(ϕ)∨ v(ψ) v is a homomorphism
iff w≤ v(ϕ) or w≤ v(ψ) w ∈ J∞(F+) and F+ distributive
iff w  ϕ or w  ψ (1) on ϕ and ψ by induction hypothesis.
2In the Boolean setting, F+ is the powerset algebra P(W ); in the distributive setting, F+ is the algebra P↑(W ) of the
upward-closed subsets of F.
3Notice that in order for this equivalent functional representation to be well defined, we need to assume that the relation
 is F+-compatible, i.e. that −1[p] ∈ F+ for every p ∈ Prop. In the Boolean case, every relation from W to L is clearly
F+-compatible, but already in the distributive case this is not so: indeed −1[p] needs to be an upward- or downward-closed
subset of F. This gives rise to the persistence condition, e.g. in the relational semantics of intuitionistic logic.
4In the Boolean setting, w := {w}; in the distributive setting, w := w↑= {w′ ∈W | w≤ w′}.
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To define an interpretation of L on polarities and reflexive graphs, we are going to apply the homomorphism-
to-relation direction of the argument illustrated above. That is, for an arbitrary polarity P= (A,X , I) any
homomorphic assignment v : L→ P+ will give rise to pairs of relations (,≻) such that  ⊆ A×L and
≻ ⊆ X ×L, so that for every a ∈ A and x ∈ X , and every L-formula ϕ ,
a  ϕ iff a≤ v(ϕ), (2)
x≻ ϕ iff v(ϕ)≤ x, (3)
where, on the right-hand side of the equivalences above, a = (a↑↓,a↑) ∈ P+ and x= (x↓,x↓↑) ∈ P+. For
instance, spelling out conditions (2) and (3) for ∨-formulas, we obtain the following clauses:
x≻ ϕ ∨ψ iff v(ϕ ∨ψ)≤ x definition of ≻ as in (3)
iff v(ϕ)∨ v(ψ)≤ x v homomorphism
iff v(ϕ)≤ x and v(ψ)≤ x definition of ∨
iff x≻ ϕ and x≻ ψ (3) on ϕ and ψ by induction hypothesis.
a  ϕ ∨ψ
iff a≤ v(ϕ ∨ψ) definition of  as in (2)
iff a≤ v(ϕ)∨ v(ψ) v homomorphism
iff [[a]]⊆ [[v(ϕ)∨ v(ψ)]] definition of order in P+
iff a↑↓ ⊆ (([v(ϕ)])∩ ([v(ψ)]))↓ definition of a and ∨ in P+
iff a ∈ (([v(ϕ)])∩ ([v(ψ)]))↓ definition of Galois-closure
iff for all x ∈ X , if x ∈ ([v(ϕ)])∩ ([v(ψ)]) then aIx definition of (·)↓
iff for all x ∈ X , if x ∈ ([v(ϕ)]) and x ∈ ([v(ψ)]) then aIx definition of ∩
iff for all x ∈ X , if x↓↑ ⊆ ([v(ϕ)]) and x↓↑ ⊆ ([v(ψ)]) then aIx definition of Galois-closure
iff for all x ∈ X , if v(ϕ)≤ x and v(ψ)≤ x then aIx definition of order in P+
iff for all x ∈ X , if x≻ ϕ and x≻ ψ then aIx. (3) on ϕ and ψ by ind. hyp.
Notice that, unlike the argument in the distributive setting, we did not need to appeal to join- or (meet-
)irreducibility. Reasoning in an analogous way for the remaining connectives, we obtain the following
recursive definition of  and ≻ on polarities for all L-formulas:
a ⊥ aIx for all x ∈ X x≻⊥ always
a ⊤ always x≻⊤ aIx for all a ∈ A
a  p iff a ∈ [[v(p)]] x≻ p iff x ∈ ([v(p)])
a  ϕ ∧ψ iff a  ϕ and a ψ
x≻ ϕ ∧ψ iff for all a ∈ A, if a  ϕ and a ψ then aIx
a  ϕ ∨ψ iff for all x ∈ X , if x≻ ϕ and x≻ ψ then aIx
x≻ ϕ ∨ψ iff x≻ ϕ and x≻ ψ .
Likewise, for an arbitrary reflexive graph X= (Z,E), any homomorphic assignment v : L→ X+ will
give rise to pairs of relations (,≻) such that  ⊆ Z×L and ≻ ⊆ Z×L, so that for every z ∈ Z and
every L-formula ϕ ,
z  ϕ iff zs ≤ v(ϕ), (4)
z≻ ϕ iff v(ϕ)≤ zr, (5)
where, on the right-hand side of the equivalences above, zs = (z
↑↓,z↑) ∈X+ and zr = (z↓,z↓↑) ∈X+. For
instance, spelling out conditions (4) and (5) for ∨-formulas, we obtain the following clauses:
z≻ ϕ ∨ψ iff v(ϕ ∨ψ)≤ zr definition of ≻ as in (5)
iff v(ϕ)∨ v(ψ)≤ zr v homomorphism
iff v(ϕ)≤ zr and v(ψ)≤ zr definition of ∨
iff z≻ ϕ and z≻ ψ . (5) on ϕ and ψ by induction hypothesis.
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z  ϕ ∨ψ
iff zs ≤ v(ϕ ∨ψ) definition of  as in (4)
iff zs ≤ v(ϕ)∨ v(ψ) v homomorphism
iff [[zs]]⊆ [[v(ϕ)∨ v(ψ)]] definition of order in X+
iff z↑↓ ⊆ (([v(ϕ)])∩ ([v(ψ)]))↓ definition of zs and ∨ in X+
iff z ∈ (([v(ϕ)])∩ ([v(ψ)]))↓ definition of Galois-closure
iff for all z′ ∈ Z, if z′ ∈ ([v(ϕ)])∩ ([v(ψ)]) then zEcz′ definition of (·)↓
iff for all z′ ∈ Z, if z′ ∈ ([v(ϕ)]) and z′ ∈ ([v(ψ)]) then zEcz′ definition of ∩
iff for all z′ ∈ Z, if z↓↑ ⊆ ([v(ϕ)]) and x↓↑ ⊆ ([v(ψ)]) then zEcz′ definition of Galois-closure
iff for all z′ ∈ Z, if v(ϕ)≤ x and v(ψ)≤ z′r then zE
cz′ definition of order in P+
iff for all z′ ∈ Z, if z′ ≻ ϕ and z′ ≻ ψ then zEcz′ (5) on ϕ and ψ by ind. hyp.
iff for all z′ ∈ Z, if zEz′ then z′ 6≻ ϕ or z′ 6≻ ψ . contraposition.
Reasoning in an analogous way, we obtain the following recursive definition of  and ≻ on graphs for
all L-formulas:
z≻⊥ always z ⊥ never
z ⊤ always z≻⊤ never
z  p iff z ∈V (p) z≻ p iff for all z′, if z′Ez then z′ 6 p
z≻ ϕ ∨ψ iff z≻ ϕ and z≻ ψ
z  ϕ ∨ψ iff for all z′, if zEz′ then z′ 6≻ ϕ or z′ 6≻ ψ
z  ϕ ∧ψ iff z ϕ and z  ψ
z≻ ϕ ∧ψ iff for all z′, if z′Ez then z′ 6 ϕ or z′ 6 ψ
When the assignment v is clear from the context we will sometimes write [[ϕ ]] and ([ϕ ]) for [[v(ϕ)]] and
([v(ϕ)]), respectively.
3.3 Relational interpretation of additional connectives
In the present subsection, we apply the method discussed in the previous subsection to define polarity-
based and graph-based semantics for any LE-language LLE = LLE(F ,G ). Starting from complete
LLE-algebras, we will translate homomorphic assignments of LLE-formulas into relations  and ≻ via
suitable expansions of the adjunctions between complete lattices and polarities and (complete) lattices
and reflexive graphs.
Let us first recall how the usual satisfaction relation clauses can be retrieved from the algebraic
interpretation in the Boolean and distributive case for a unary diamond ♦. Let ML be the propositional
language of the logic of general lattices expanded with a unary and positive f -type connective ♦. In
what follows, we will abuse notation and identify the minimal normal ML-logic with its language. Let
W = (W,≤) be a partially ordered set (in the Boolean case, ≤ coincides with the identity ∆W ), and let
us expand W+ with a completely join-preserving unary operation ♦W
+
so as to obtain a (Boolean or
distributive) modal algebra A = (W+,♦W
+
). Let v : ML→ A be a homomorphic assignment, hence
v(♦ϕ) = ♦W
+
v(ϕ).
As done in the previous subsection, the recursive definition of the relation  ⊆W ×ML correspond-
ing to the assignment v is obtained by spelling out equation (1).
For the case of ♦-formulas, since W+ is a perfect5 distributive lattice and v(♦ψ) ∈W+, we get
v(ψ) =
∨
{w′ ∈ J∞(W+) | w′ ≤ v(ψ)} =
∨
{w′ ∈ J∞(W+) | w′  ψ}. Since by assumption v is a ho-
momorphism, v(♦ψ) = ♦W
+
v(ψ) = ♦W
+
(
∨
{w′ ∈ J∞(W+) | w′  ψ}), and since ♦W
+
is completely
join-preserving, we get:
5A complete lattice A is perfect if it is both completely join-generated by the set J∞(A) of its completely join-irreducible
elements, and completely meet-generated by the set M∞(A) of its completely meet-irreducible elements.
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v(♦ψ) =
∨
{♦W
+
w′ | w′  ψ}.
Hence, for any w ∈W ,
w  ♦ψ iff w≤ v(♦ψ)
iff w≤
∨
{♦W
+
w′ | w′  ψ}
iff w≤ ♦W
+
w′ for some w′ ∈W s.t. w′  ψ (w completely join-prime)
iff wR♦w
′ for some w′ ∈W s.t. w′  ψ .
So we have done two things at the same time: Firstly, we have defined the accessibility relation R♦ ⊆
W ×W corresponding to the interpretation of ♦ as ♦W
+
as follows:
wR♦w
′ iff w≤ ♦W
+
w′.
Secondly, we have derived the corresponding defining clause for ♦-formulas. The same can be done
in the general lattice case, starting e.g. from a polarity P = (A,X , I) and expanding P+ with a com-
pletely join preserving unary operation ♦P
+
so as to obtain a lattice-based complete modal algebra
A = (P+,♦P
+
). Analogously to the way we argued above and appealing to Proposition 3.1, we can
write v(ψ) =
∨
{a ∈ P+ | a≤ v(ψ)} =
∨
{a ∈ P+ | a  ψ}. Since by assumption v is a homomorphism,
v(♦ψ) = ♦P
+
v(ψ) = ♦P
+
(
∨
{a ∈ P+ | a  ψ}), and since ♦P
+
is completely join-preserving, we get:
v(♦ψ) =
∨
{♦P
+
a | a  ψ}. (6)
However, the chain of equivalences above breaks down in the third step, since the elements a are
not in general completely join-prime anymore, but only complete join-generators (cf. Proposition 3.1).
However, we can obtain a reduction also in this case, by crucially making use of the completely meet-
generating elements x:
x≻ ♦ψ iff v(♦ψ)≤ x definition of ≻ as in (3)
iff
∨
{♦P
+
a | a  ψ} ≤ x (6)
iff for all a ∈ A, if a ψ then ♦P
+
a≤ x definition of
∨
iff for all a ∈ A, if a ψ then xR♦a, (7)
where we have defined the accessibility relation R♦ ⊆ X ×A corresponding to the interpretation of ♦ as
♦P
+
as follows:
xR♦a iff ♦
P+a≤ x. (7)
Now, using the fact that the set of elements x for x ∈ X are meet-generators of P+, we can write:
a  ♦ψ
iff a≤ v(♦ψ) definition of  as in (2)
iff a≤
∧
{x | v(♦ψ)≤ x} x for x ∈ X meet-generators of P+
iff for all x ∈ X , if v(♦ψ)≤ x then a≤ x definition of
∧
iff for all x ∈ X , if x≻ ♦ψ then aIx definition of ≻ as in (3).
Similar arguments yield the recursive definition of  and ≻ on polarity-based relational structures for
formulas in any LLE-signature, for instance:
a ϕ iff for all x ∈ X , if x≻ ϕ then aRx x≻ϕ iff for all a ∈ A, if a ϕ then aIx
a ⊳ϕ iff for all x ∈ X , if x≻⊳ϕ then aIx x≻⊳ϕ iff for all x′ ∈ X , if x′ ≻ ϕ then xR⊳x
′
a ⊲ϕ iff for all a′ ∈ A, if a′  ϕ then aR⊲a
′ x≻⊲ϕ iff for all a ∈ A, if a ⊲ϕ then aIx
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where the relations R ⊆ A×X , R⊳ ⊆ X×X and R⊲ ⊆ A×A are defined as follows:
aRx iff a≤
P+x xR⊳x
′ iff ⊳P
+
x′ ≤ x aR⊲a
′ iff a≤⊲P
+
a′. (8)
More generally, for any connective f ∈F of arity n f and any connective g ∈ G of arity ng, any interpre-
tation of f and g on P+ will yield relations R f ⊆ X ×A
(n f ) and Rg ⊆ A×X
(ng), where A
(n f ) denotes the
n f -fold cartesian product of A and X such that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n f if f is monotone in its ith coordinate
then the ith coordinate of A
(n f )
is A, whereas if f is antitone in its ith coordinate then the ith coordinate
of A
(n f ) is X , and X
(ng) is defined in a similar way w.r.t. g. The relations R f and Rg are defined as follows:
R f (x,a
(n f )) iff f P
+
(a(n f ))≤ x Rg(a,x
(ng)) iff a≤ gP
+
(x(ng)). (9)
The corresponding clauses for  and ≻ are then the following ones:
a  g(ϕ) iff for all x(ng) ∈ X
(ng), if x(ng) ≻(ng) ϕ then Rg(a,x
(ng))
x≻ g(ϕ) iff for all a ∈ A, if a  g(ϕ) then aIx
x≻ f (ϕ) iff for all a(n f ) ∈ A
(n f ), if a(n f ) (n f ) ϕ then R f (x,a
(n f ))
a  f (ϕ) iff for all x ∈ X , if x≻ g(ϕ) then aIx.
where, if a(n f ) ∈ A
(n f )
, the notation a(n f ) (n f ) ϕ refers to the conjunction over 1 ≤ i ≤ n f of statements
of the form ai  ϕi, if f is positive in its ith coordinate, or xi ≻ ϕi, if f is negative in its ith coordinate,
whereas if x(ng) ∈ X
(ng), the notation x(ng) ≻(ng) ϕ refers to the conjunction over 1≤ i≤ ng of statements
of the form xi ≻ ϕi, if g is positive in its ith coordinate, or ai  ϕi, if g is negative in its ith coordinate.
As an example, we instantiate the above general clauses for a binary implication-like connective →
in G which is antitone in the first coordinate and monotone in the second. The relation corresponding to
this connective is then R→ ⊆ A×A×X such that R→(a,b,x) iff a≤ b→
P+ x, and the clauses for  and
≻ become:
a  ϕ → ψ iff for all b ∈ A and x ∈ X , if b  ϕ and x≻ ψ , then R→(a,b,x) and
x≻ ϕ → ψ iff for all a ∈ A, if a  ϕ → ψ then aIx.
Likewise, starting from a reflexive graph X= (Z,E) and a homomorphic assignment v : LLE → X+
we will extend the relation  and ≻ to the whole of LLE via suitable relations associated with each
logical connective. We do not expand further on the derivations (some of which are more extensively
reported in Section A.1), but limit ourselves to reporting the definition for the unary modalities and the
general f ∈F and g ∈ G .
z≻ ♦ϕ iff for all z′, if zR♦z
′ then z′ 6 ϕ z ♦ϕ iff for all z′, if zEz′ then z′ 6≻ ♦ϕ
z ψ iff for all z′, if zRz
′ then z′ 6≻ ψ z≻ψ iff for all z′, if z′Ez then z′ 6ψ
z≻⊳ψ iff for all z′, if zR⊳z
′ then z′ 6≻ ψ z⊳ψ iff for all z′, if zEz′ then z′ 6≻ ψ
z ⊲ψ iff for all z′, if zR⊲z
′ then z′ 6 ψ z≻⊲ψ iff for all z′, if z′Ez then z′ 6⊲ψ
where the relations R, R♦, R⊳ and R⊲ are defined as follows:
zR♦z
′ iff ♦X
+
z′s 6≤ zr zRz
′ iff zs 6≤
X+z′r
zR⊳z
′ iff ⊳X
+
z′r 6≤ zr zR⊲z
′ iff zs 6≤⊲
X+z′s.
(10)
As in the case of polarities, we can also generalize these definitions to arbitrary connectives f ∈F
and g ∈ G with arity n f and ng, respectively. Any interpretation of f and g on X+ will yield relations
R f ⊆ Z
n f+1 and Rg ⊆ Z
ng+1 defined as follows:
R f (z,z) iff f
X+(z
(n f )
s ) 6≤ zr Rg(z,z
(ng)) iff zs 6≤ g
X+(z
(ng)
r ), (11)
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where the i-th component of z
(n f )
s is zs (zr) if f is monotone (antitone) in its i-th argument, and the i-th
component of z
(ng)
r is zr (zs) if g is monotone (antitone) in its i-th argument.
Given an ng-tuple of formulas ϕ = (ϕ1, . . . ,ϕng) and z = (z1, . . . ,zng) ∈ Z
ng , we write z ≻(ng) ϕ to
indicate that zi ≻ ϕi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ng for which g is monotone in the i-th coordinate and that z j  ϕ j
for all 1≤ j ≤ ng for which g is antitone in the j-th coordinate. Similarly, given an n f -tuple of formulas
ϕ = (ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn f ) and z= (z1, . . . ,zn f ) ∈ Z
n f , we write z (n f ) ϕ to indicate that zi  ϕi for all 1≤ i≤ n f
for which f is monotone in the i-th coordinate and that z j ≻ ϕ j for all 1≤ j ≤ n f for which f is antitone
in the j-th coordinate. Using this notation, the corresponding clauses for  and ≻ are:
z  g(ϕ) iff for all z ∈ Zng , if Rg(z,z) then it is not the case that z ≻
(ng) ϕ
z≻ g(ϕ) iff for all z′ ∈ Z, if z′Ez then z′ 6 g(ϕ)
z≻ f (ϕ) iff for all z ∈ Zn f , if R f (z,z) then it is not the case that z 
(n f ) ϕ
z  f (ϕ) iff for all z′ ∈ Z, if zEz′ then z′ 6≻ f (ϕ).
3.4 Projecting onto the classical setting
We finish this section by specifying how the polarity-based and graph-based semantics discussed in the
previous subsections project onto the Kripke semantics of classical normal modal logic. For ease of
presentation we address this issue in the signature of LPML.
Algebraically, the polarity-based and graph-based structures F that can be recognized as “classi-
cal” are exactly those the complex algebra F+ of which is (isomorphic to) a powerset algebra (possibly
endowed with extra operations). This is the case of structures based on graphs X = (Z,E) such that
E = ∆, or based on polarities P = (A,X , I) such that A = X = Z for some set Z, and aIx iff a 6= x for
all a,x ∈ Z. In these cases, the powerset algebra P(Z) can be represented as a concept lattice each
element of which is of the form (Y,Y c) for any Y ⊆ Z. Therefore, for any formula ϕ interpreted in these
structures, ([ϕ ]) = {z ∈ Z | z ≻ ϕ} = [[ϕ ]]c, and hence z ≻ ϕ iff z 6 ϕ . This of course provides a more
direct way to reduce ≻ to  than the one defined in terms of the operations (·)↑ and (·)↓, which allows to
formulate the well known recursive definition of satisfaction in the classical setting purely in terms of .
In particular, the satisfaction clause for ∨-formulas on the “classical” polarity-based models described
above can be rewritten as follows: for any a ∈ Z and all formulas ϕ and ψ ,
a  ϕ ∨ψ
iff for all x ∈ X , if x≻ ϕ and x≻ ψ then aIx
iff for all x ∈ X , if x 6 ϕ and x 6 ψ then a 6= x
iff for all x ∈ X , if a= x then x  ϕ or x  ψ
iff a  ϕ or a  ψ .
Likewise, the satisfaction clause for ⊥ can be rewritten as
a ⊥ iff a 6≻ ⊥ which is never the case.
As for the interpretation of ♦-formulas, if JRc
♦
⊆ X ×A is the corresponding relation on the given “clas-
sical” polarity-based models as described above, applying the following clause
x≻ ♦ψ iff for all a ∈ A, if a  ψ then xJRc
♦
a
yields
x ♦ψ iff x 6≻ ♦ψ
iff for some a ∈ A, a  ψ and (x,a) /∈ JRc
♦
iff for some a ∈ A, a  ψ and xR♦a.
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where xJRc
♦
a iff (x,a) /∈ R♦ for every x,a ∈ Z. As for the interpretation of -formulas, stipulating,
likewise, that aIRcx iff (a,x) /∈ R for every x,a ∈ Z, the satisfaction clause for -formulas can be
rewritten as follows:
a ϕ iff for all x ∈ X , if x≻ ϕ then aIRcx
iff for all x ∈ X , if x 6 ϕ then (a,x) /∈ R
iff for all x ∈ X , if aRx then x  ϕ .
Similar computations show that also in the setting of the graph-based semantics, the satisfaction and
refutation clauses project to the well known ones. For instance, when zEz′ iff z= z′ and z≻ ϕ iff z 6 ϕ ,
z ϕ ∨ψ iff for all z′ ∈ Z, if zEz′ then z′ 6≻ ϕ or z′ 6≻ ψ
iff for all z′ ∈ Z, if z= z′ then z′  ϕ or z′  ψ
iff z  ϕ or z  ψ .
Analogously, the following clause
z≻ ♦ϕ iff for all z′, if zR♦z
′ then z′ 6 ϕ
yields
z ♦ϕ iff z 6≻ ♦ϕ
iff for some z′, zR♦z
′ and z′  ϕ .
The remaining computations are omitted.
In conclusion, in the present section we have discussed a uniform methodology for defining relational
semantics for normal LE-logics in any signature on the basis of their standard interpretation on complete
LE-algebras of compatible signature. We have concretely illustrated how this methodology works in the
case of two different semantic environments, and we have discussed how these environments project onto
the Kripke semantics of classical normal modal logic. However, in order for these environments to ‘make
sense’ in a more fundamental way, we need to couple them with extra-mathematical interpretations which
simultaneously account for the meaning of all connectives, and which coherently extend to the meaning
of logical axioms and of their first-order correspondents. In the next section, we discuss two possible
interpretations, and the views on LE-logics elicited by each of them.
4 From semantics to meaning
Any extra-mathematical interpretation of LE-logics must account for the failure of distributivity. Al-
though, as discussed in the previous section, polarity-based and graph-based semantic structures arise
from the standard interpretation in LE-algebras via the same dual-characterization methodology, they
give rise to two radically different views on what LE-logics are and mean. The key difference lies
in a dichotomy between two interpretive strategies, each of which identifies different sources of non-
distributivity. The first such strategy, supported by the polarity-based semantics, drops the interpretation
of ∧ and ∨ as conjunction and disjunction in natural language and stipulates that LE-formulas do not de-
note sentences describing states of affairs, but rather objects with a different ontology, such as categories,
concepts, questions, theories, to which a truth value might not necessarily be applicable. The second in-
terpretive strategy is supported by the graph based semantics and retains the sentential denotation of for-
mulas in the context of a propositional logic which can be thought of as a kind of ‘hyper-constructivism’.
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4.1 LE-logics as logics of formal concepts, categories, theories, interrogative agendas...
Polarities as abstract databases. The idea that lattices are the proper mathematical environment for
discussing “especially systems which are in any sense hierarchies” goes back to Birkhoff [6]. Based
on this idea, Wille [33] and his collaborators developed Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) as a theory in
information science aimed at the formal representation and analysis of conceptual structures, which has
been applied to a wide range of fields ranging from psychology, sociology and linguistics to biology and
chemistry.
Building on philosophical insights developed by the school of Port-Royal [2], Wille specified con-
cepts in terms of their extension, i.e. the set of objects which exemplify the given concept, and their
intension, i.e. the set of attributes shared by the objects in the extension of the given concept, and iden-
tified Birkhoff’s polarities P = (A,X , I) (cf. Section 3.1), also referred to as formal contexts, as the
appropriate mathematical environment in which to formally represent these ideas: indeed, a polarity P
as above can be understood as an abstract representation of a database, recording information about a
given set A of objects (relevant to a given context or situation), and a set X of relevant attributes or fea-
tures. In this representation, the (incidence) relation I ⊆ A×X encodes whether object a ∈ A has feature
x ∈ X as aIx. The Galois-adjoint pair of maps (·)↑ : P(A)→ P(X) and (·)↓ : P(X)→ P(A) can be
understood as concept-generating maps: namely, as maps taking any set B of objects to the intension
B↑ which uniquely determines the formal concept (B↑↓,B↑) generated by B, and any set Y of attributes
to the extension Y ↓ which uniquely determines the formal concept (Y ↓,Y ↓↑) generated by Y . Hence,
the philosophical and cognitive insight that concepts do not occur in isolation, but rather arise within a
hierarchy of other concepts, finds a very natural representation in the construction of the complete lattice
P+ and its natural order as the sub-concept relation. Indeed, a subconcept of a given concept, understood
as a more restrictive concept, will have a smaller extension (i.e. fewer examples) and a larger intension
(i.e. a larger set of requirements that objects need to satisfy in order to count as examples of the given
sub-concept). This interpretation accounts for the failure of distributivity, as we will concretely illustrate
below.
Propositional lattice logic as the basic logic of formal concepts. Imposing the FCA interpretation
of polarities discussed above on the polarity-based semantics of the logic L (Section 3.2) yields an in-
terpretation of L-formulas as terms (i.e. names) denoting formal concepts. Starting from assignments to
proposition variables, any L-formula ϕ is then interpreted on a given polarity P = (A,X , I) as a formal
concept ([[ϕ ]],([ϕ ])) ∈ P+; specifically, for each object a ∈ A and feature x ∈ X , the relations a  ϕ and
x≻ ϕ can be respectively understood as ‘object a is a member of (or exemplifies) concept ϕ’ and ‘feature
x describes concept ϕ’, in the sense that x is a required attribute of every example/member of ϕ . Accord-
ingly, this reading suggests that ϕ ∧ψ can be understood as ‘the greatest (i.e. least restrictive) common
subconcept of concept ϕ and concept ψ’, i.e. the concept the extension of which is the intersection of
the extensions of ϕ and ψ . Similarly, ϕ ∨ψ is ‘the least (i.e. most restrictive) common superconcept of
concept ϕ and concept ψ’, i.e. the concept the intension of which is the intersection of the intensions of
ϕ and ψ ; the constant ⊤ can be understood as the most generic (or comprehensive) concept (i.e. the one
that, when interpreted in any given polarity P as above, allows all objects a ∈ A as examples) while ⊥
as the most restrictive (i.e. the one that, when interpreted in any given polarity P as above, requires its
examples to have all attributes x ∈ X ). Finally, ϕ ⊢ψ can be understood as the statement that ‘concept ϕ
is a sub-concept of concept ψ’.
Asmentioned above, this interpretation accounts for the failure of distributivity. Indeed, objects in the
extension of concept ϕ ∨ψ are only required to have all attributes common to the intentions of concepts
ϕ and ψ ; this weaker requirement potentially allows objects in [[ϕ ∨ψ]] which belong to neither [[ϕ ]] nor
to [[ψ ]]. To illustrate this point concretely, consider the ‘database’ of theatrical plays P= (A,X , I) the set
of objects of which is A := {a,b,c}, where a is A Midsummer Night’s Dream, b is King Lear, and c is
Julius Cesar, while its set of features is X := {x,y,z}, where x is ‘no happy end’, y is ‘some characters
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are real historical figures’, and z is ‘two characters fall in love with each other’. The following picture
represents P and its associated concept lattice.
(∅,xyz)
(c,xy)
(bc,x)
(abc,∅)
(a,z)
 
X
I
A
x y z
a b c
Consider the atomic concept-variables r,d,h where r stands for ‘romantic comedy’, d for ‘drama’ and
h for ‘historical drama’. Consider the assignment into P+ which maps r to (a,z), d to (bc,x) and h to
(c,yz). Notice that b ∈ [[h∨ r]] = [[⊤]] even though b /∈ [[h]]∪ [[r]]. Accordingly, under this assignment,
h∨r is interpreted as the top element of the concept lattice. The concept d∧r is interpreted as the bottom
element and, as historical drama is a subgenre of drama, d ∧h coincides with h. Hence (d ∧h)∨ (d ∧ r)
coincides with h while d∧ (h∨ r) coincides with d. Thus distribution of ∧ over ∨ fails.
Dually, objects in the extension of concept ϕ ∧ψ might have more attributes in common than those
in ([ϕ ])∪ ([ψ ]); for instance in the example above, r∧ d is the concept (∅,xyz) which requires feature
y which is neither required by r nor by d; hence h∨ (r ∧ d) coincides with h, while (h∨ d)∧ (h∨ r)
coincides with d, witnessing the failure of ∨ over ∧ also.
Lattice-based normal modal logic as an epistemic logic of formal concepts. So far, we have dis-
cussed how the polarity-based semantics of propositional lattice logic L allows for an interpretation of
L-formulas as names of formal concepts, and for a coherent interpretation of the meaning of all proposi-
tional lattice connectives in a way that makes the failure of distributivity a desirable feature rather than
an awkward issue. Next, based on [16, 17], we discuss a first way in which this interpretation can be
extended also to the modal connectives. For the sake of simplicity, let us consider the minimal normal
LE-logic L, in the language specified according to the notation of Section 2 by instantiating F :=∅ and
G := {}, with unary and monotone. In what follows, we will abuse notation and identify L with its
language. As discussed in Section 3.3, this logic can be interpreted on relational structures F = (P,R)
such that P = (A,X , I) is a polarity, and R ⊆ A×X is a (compatible, see Definition A.1) relation such
that, for any assignment v : Prop→ P+, corresponding relations  ⊆ A×L and ≻ ⊆ X ×L can be
defined. In the case of -formulas, this yields
a ϕ iff for all x ∈ X , if x≻ ϕ then aRx x≻ϕ iff for all a ∈ A, if aϕ then aIx.
Building on the understanding of polarities as abstract representation of databases, the relational struc-
tures F = (P,R) can be understood as (abstract representations of) enriched databases which, together
with objective information about objects and their features encoded in the incidence relation I of P, en-
code also subjective information regarding whether given objects have given attributes according to a
given agent; this understanding allows us to read aRx as ‘object a has attribute x according to agent i.
Of course, this interpretation can be further specialized so as to represent agents’ knowledge (aRx iff
‘agent i knows that object a has attribute x’), beliefs (aRx iff ‘agent i believes that object a has attribute
x’), perceptions (aRx iff ‘agent i sees that object a has attribute x’), evidential reasoning (aRx iff ‘agent
i has evidence that object a has attribute x’), and so on. Each of these epistemic interpretations will give
rise to a different epistemic reading of ϕ as ‘concept ϕ according to the given agent i’: namely, ‘con-
cept ϕ as is known/believed/perceived/experienced by agent i’. Also in the case of L-formulas, for
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every object a and attribute x, the symbols a  ϕ and x ≻ ϕ can be understood as ‘object a is a
member/example of ϕ’ and ‘attribute x describes ϕ’, respectively. Interestingly, the condition that
aϕ iff for all x ∈ X , if x≻ ϕ then aRx
can then be informally understood as saying that any object a is a member/example of concept ϕ accord-
ing to agent i if and only if agent i attributes to a all the defining features of concept ϕ . This reading is
indeed coherent with our informal understanding of which objects should count as members of ‘concept
ϕ according to agent i’.
Finally, one would also expect that the different variants of epistemic interpretations would satisfy
different axioms; for instance, if ϕ is interpreted as ‘concept ϕ as is known by agent i’, one would ask
whether there is some L-axioms which would encode the counterparts, in the lattice-based setting, of
well known classical epistemic principles such as the factivity condition which distinguishes knowledge
from belief, and what would this condition look like in the context of polarity-based relational structures.
As is well known, in the setting of classical normal modal logic, factivity is formalized as the modal
axiom ϕ → ϕ (which reads ‘if agent i knows that ϕ , then ϕ is indeed the case’). Moreover, this
is a Sahlqvist formula and corresponds on Kripke frames (W,R) to reflexivity or, equivalently, ∆ ⊆ R.
Since L is not sentential, the closest approximation to the classical formula ϕ → ϕ is the L-sequent
ϕ ⊢ ϕ , which turns out (cf. [15, Proposition 4.3]) to correspond on polarity-based structures F as
above to the first-order condition R ⊆ I. That is, for every object a and feature x, if aRx (i.e. if a
is endowed with x according to agent i) then aIx (i.e. object a indeed has feature x). This condition
is arguably an appropriate rendering of factivity in the setting of polarity-based relational structures,
which suggests that more modal epistemic principles might retain their intended interpretation even
under a substantial generalization step such as the one from the classical (i.e. Boolean) to the lattice-
based setting. Indeed, this is also the case for positive introspection, which in the language of classical
modal logic is formalized as ϕ → ϕ (which reads ‘if agent i knows that ϕ , then agent i knows
that she knows ϕ’). As is well known, this axiom is a Sahlqvist formula the first-order correspondent
of which on Kripke frames (W,R) is the condition R ◦R ⊆ R, namely that the relation R is transitive.
Again, the L-sequent ϕ ⊢ ϕ turns out (cf. [15, Proposition 4.3]) to correspond on polarity-based
structures F to the first-order condition6 that reads: for every object a and feature x, if agent i thinks
that a has feature x, then (agent i must recognize a as an example of what i understands as an x-object,
i.e. as a member of i’s understanding of the formal context generated by feature x, and hence) agent i
must attribute to a also all the features that, according to i, are shared by all x-objects. As in the case
of factivity, one can argue that this condition is an appropriate rendering of the principle of positive
introspection in the setting of polarity-based relational structures, since is clearly an internal coherence
requirement which seeks to justify any given attribution of a feature to an object by linking it to the
wider context of those (other) features that are consequences of the given attribution. Lastly, the notion
of omniscience, stipulating that the agent knows everything that is the case, is classically captured by the
axiom p→ p corresponding on Kripke frames to the first-order condition R ⊆ ∆. On polarity-based
structures F, the L-sequent ϕ ⊢ ϕ (cf. [15, Proposition 4.3]) corresponds to the first-order condition
I ⊆ R, indicating that, whenever an object has a feature, the agent knows this.
Lattice-based normal modal logic as the logic of rough concepts. As discussed above, the interpre-
tation of L as an epistemic logic of formal concepts, facilitated by the polarity-based semantics, extends
coherently from the informal meaning of the defining clauses of  and ≻ w.r.t. to -formulas, all the
way to the preservation of the meaning of well known epistemic principles. However, the epistemic in-
terpretation is not the only possible one; in what follows, we give pointers to another family of possible
interpretations, proposed in [15], where polarity-based relational structures for the languages LPML and
6With the aid of the notation ;I for relational composition modulo the polarity relation I (cf. [15, Section 3.4] for the full
definition) this condition can be succinctly captured as R ⊆ R ;I R.
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LDML (cf. Example 2.1) are used to generalize Rough Set Theory (RST) [60] to the setting of rough
concepts. The basic models in RST are pairs (X ,R), called approximation spaces, with X a non-empty
set and R an equivalence relation on X . The set X is to be thought of as the domain of discourse and
R as an indiscernibility relation. The equivalence classes of R establish the granularity of the discourse
by setting the limits to the distinctions that can be drawn. This granularity is captured algebraically by
the upper and lower approximation operators arising from approximation spaces, which, when applied to
any given subset T ⊆ X , encode the available information about T as follows. The lower approximation
of T of T consists of those elements whose R-equivalence classes are contained in T , while the upper
approximation of T consists of those elements whose R-equivalence classes have non-empty intersection
with T . In other words,
T :=
⋃
{R[z] | z ∈ T and R[z]⊆ T} and T :=
⋃
{R[z] | z ∈ T}.
The lower approximation T can be thought of as the set of all objects that are definitely in T , while the
upper approximation T consists of those objects that are possibly in T .
As the reader would have remarked, an approximation space is nothing but a frame for the modal
logic S5, and the lower and upper approximation of T ⊆ S are obtained by applying the interior and
closure operators given by the S5 box and diamond, respectively. This connection with modal logic has
indeed not gone unnoticed in the literature and has been elaborated in e.g. [58], [4] and [59].
In [15], conceptual approximation spaceswere defined as polarity-based LPML-structures F=(P,R,R♦)
such that P= (A,X , I) is a polarity, and R ⊆ A×X and R♦ ⊆ X×A are (compatible, see Definition A.1)
relations verifying the first-order conditions corresponding to the following modal axioms: ϕ ⊢ ♦ϕ
(seriality)7; ϕ ⊢ ϕ and ϕ ⊢ ♦ϕ (reflexivity); ϕ ⊢ ϕ and ♦♦ϕ ⊢ ♦ϕ (transitivity); ϕ ⊢ ♦ϕ and
♦ϕ ⊢ ϕ (symmetry).
Taken together, these conditions guarantee that F+ := (P, [R],〈R♦〉) is a complete lattice-based
algebra such that [R] and 〈R♦〉 are an interior and a closure operator respectively; moreover, 〈R♦〉 is the
left adjoint of [R] (i.e. aRx iff xR♦a for every a ∈ A and x ∈ X ).
Under the usual interpretation of P = (A,X , I) as a database, one possible way to understand aRx
or equivalently xR♦a is ‘there is evidence that object a has feature x’, or ‘object a demonstrably has
feature x’ (cf. [15, Section 5.1]). This intuitive understanding makes it plausible to assume that R ⊆ I.
Recall that that  for -formulas and of ≻ for ♦-formulas (cf. discussion in Section 3.3) were defined
as follows:
a ϕ iff for all x ∈ X , if x≻ ϕ then aRx x≻ ♦ϕ iff for all a ∈ A, if a ϕ then xR♦a.
Under the interpretation discussed above, these clauses can be understood as saying that ϕ is the con-
cept the examples/members of which are exactly those objects that demonstrably have all the features
shared by ϕ-objects, and that ♦ϕ is the concept described by the features which all ϕ-objects demon-
strably have. Hence, ϕ can be understood as the (sub)concept of the certified members of ϕ , while ♦ϕ
as the (super) concept of the potential members of ϕ .
Thus, under the interpretation of R and R♦ proposed above, the polarity-based semantics of LPML
supports the understanding of ϕ and ♦ϕ as the lower and upper approximations of concept ϕ , respec-
tively. Notice that, while in approximation spaces the relation R relates indiscernible states, and thus
directly encodes the extent of our ignorance, in the setting of conceptual approximation spaces, R (or
equivalently R♦) directly encode the (possibly partial) extent of our knowledge or information.
7In the presence of reflexivity, seriality becomes redundant; however, for the sake of making the generalization more mod-
ular, in [15] the basic framework of conceptual approximation spaces only requires seriality.
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From concepts to other ontologies. In [15], other more specific interpretations are proposed concern-
ing situations which span from the analysis of text databases to medical diagnoses and the analysis of
markets. Accordingly, in each of these situations, ϕ and ♦ϕ can be given more specific interpretations
as lower and upper approximations of concepts or categories or relevant clusters.
For instance (cf. [15, Section 5.4,] modified), text databases can be modelled as polarity-based LPML-
structures F= (P,R,R♦) such that P= (A,X , I) with A being a set of documents, X a set of words, and
aIx being understood as ‘document a has word x as a keyword’. Formal concepts arising from such an
F can be understood as themes or topics, intensionally described by Galois-stable sets of (key)words. In
this situation, one of the many possible interpretations of aRx or equivalently xR♦a is ‘document a has
word x as its first or second keyword’, which again makes it plausible to assume that R ⊆ I.
As another example (cf. [15, Section 5.5] modified), let P = (A,X , I) represent a hospital, where A
is the set of patients, X is the set of symptoms, and aIx iff “patient a has symptom x”. Concepts arising
from this representation are syndromes, intensionally described by Galois-stable sets of symptoms. In
this situation, let aRx, or equivalently xR♦a, iff ‘a has been tested for symptom xwith positive outcome’.
As a third example (cf. [15, Section 5.8] modified), let P= (A,X , I) where A is the set of consumers,
X is the set of market-products, and aIx iff ‘consumer a buys product x’. Concepts arising from this
representation are consumer segments, intensionally described by Galois-stable sets of market-products.
In this situation, let aRx, or equivalently xR♦a, iff ‘a buys x from a certain producer i’. Then ϕ
denotes the market share of producer i in consumer segment ϕ .
As a fourth example, let P = (A,X , I) where A is the set of empirical hypotheses, X is the set of
variables, and aIx iff ‘hypothesis a is formulated in terms of variable x’. Concepts arising from this
representation are empirical theories, extensionally described by Galois-stable sets of hypotheses and
intensionally described by Galois-stable sets of variables. In this situation, let aRx, or equivalently
xR♦a, iff ‘x is a dependent variable for hypothesis a’. Thenx contains all hypotheses that compete with
each other.
Finally, let P = (A,X , I) represent a decision-making situation in which A is the set of decision-
makers, X is the set of issues, and aIx iff ‘agent a finds issue x relevant’. Concepts arising from this
representation are interrogative agendas, extensionally described by Galois-stable coalitions and inten-
sionally described by Galois-stable sets of issues. In this situation, let aRx, or equivalently xR♦a, iff
‘agent a regards x as a positive issue’. For example, if A are the members of a hiring committee and
X the features of potential applicants, agent a could regard “the candidate obtained their PhD recently”
as a desirable characteristic, i.e. a positive issue, while other agents might prefer a more experienced
candidate and therefore not regard this as positive. This would mean that R ⊆ I and that, extensionally,
ϕ would be the coalition of all agents who are positive towards all issues on interrogative agenda ϕ .
4.2 LE-logics as logics of informational entropy
Reflexive graphs as generalized intuitionistic frames. As discussed above, polarity-based semantics
supports an interpretation of non-distributive logics as logics of formal concepts (for specific signatures:
epistemic logic of concepts, logic of rough concepts etc). Under this interpretation, formulas do not
denote states of affairs but rather are names for formal concepts in the sense of FCA. This interpretation
can be further specialized to entities such as categories, theories, and interrogative agendas.
Graph-based semantics suggests quite another interpretation of nondistributive logics, in which for-
mulas do denote states of affairs; below we will argue that, under this interpretation, non-distributive
lattice logic can be understood as a hyper-constructivist logic which generalizes intuitionistic logic just
like intuitionistic logic generalizes classical logic.
As discussed in Section 3.2, for any reflexive graph X = (Z,E), homomorphic assignments v : L→
X+ map L-formulas ϕ to tuples ([[ϕ ]],([ϕ ])) which, as discussed in Section 3.4, reduce to ([[ϕ ]], [[ϕ ]]c)
when E := ∆. Hence, [[ϕ ]] = {z ∈ Z | z ϕ} and ([ϕ ]) = {z∈ Z | z≻ ϕ} can be respectively understood as
the satisfaction and refutation set of ϕ under v. Since ([[ϕ ]],([ϕ ])) is a Galois-stable pair, also when E :=
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∆, the satisfaction and refutation set of a given formula completely determine each other via the identities
([ϕ ]) = [[ϕ ]]↑ and [[ϕ ]] = ([ϕ ])↓. However, as we will see, in contrast with the classical and intuitionistic
setting, at given state z, the truth value of a given formula ϕ can be undefined (i.e. z 6 ϕ and z 6≻ ϕ). This
potential indeterminacy of formulas at states of graph-based models is the main characterizing feature
of this semantic setting, and can be understood as witnessing the failure of the principle of excluded
middle not just anymore at the level of the object language (as is the case of intuitionistic logic) but at
the more fundamental, meta-linguistic level of the satisfaction and refutation of formulas. This property
of the graph-based semantics of non-distributive logics justifies our view of non-distributive logics as
‘hyper-constructivist’ logics.
In order to discuss this generalization, it will be useful to first recall how the state-based semantics
of intuitionistic logic generalizes the state-based semantic of classical propositional logic. As discussed
in Section 3.2, a ‘relational structure’ for classical propositional logic is a structure F= (S,∆) where S a
nonempty set and ∆⊆ S×S is the identity relation. As is well known, given an assignment v :Prop→F+,
any formula is either true or false at each state (but at no state can a formula be both true and false), it is
true precisely when its negation is false, and its truth value only depends on the values of its occurring
propositional variables at the given state. A relational structure for intuitionistic propositional logic is a
structure F= (S,≤) where S a nonempty set and ≤ is a reflexive and transitive relation. In this case, for
a given assignment v : Prop→ F+, any formula is again either true or false at each state (but never both
true and false); however, the fact that a given formula is refuted at a given state does not imply that the
negation of that formula is satisfied at that state; indeed, the given state might refute both the formula
and its negation, yielding the well known failure of the classical principle of excluded middle. More
generally, the satisfaction of a formula at a given state might depend on the truth values of its occurring
propositional variables at the successors of the given state. The characterizing properties of intuitionistic
satisfaction, those that mark its difference from classical satisfaction, are all grounded on the fact that
(homomorphic) assignments of proposition variables are persistent, in the sense of being upward-closed
with respect to ≤, i.e. the fact that v(ϕ) ∈ F+ ∼= P↑(S) for any formula ϕ , and hence if ϕ is true at a
given state s, it will remain true along any forward-looking ≤-branch stemming from s (and dually, if ϕ
is false at a given state s, it was so throughout any backward-looking ≤-branch stemming from s).
Persistence supports our understanding of intuitionistic truth as an inherently procedural truth: under
the higher standard required by having to declare true at a given state only those statements that e.g. are
backed by evidence in support of their truth at that state, or for which a procedure has been completed at
that state which effectively establishes their truth, the failure of the principle of excluded middle becomes
a desirable feature, since, e.g. at a given state, there might not be enough evidence in support of a given
statement or in support of its negation; however, it is also reasonable to require that, once proven at
a given state, a statement cannot be unproven, therefore its (proven) truth persists at the successors of
the given state. As mentioned above, when moving from the Boolean to the intuitionistic setting, the
meaning of the implication becomes “intensional”, in the specific sense that the satisfaction of p→ q
at any given state s of an intuitionistic frame (S,≤) does not just depend on the value of p and q at
s, but also on the values of p and q at the ≤-successors of s. This change in the interpretation of →-
formulas can be explained from a technical ground as the consequence of translating the interpretation of
→-formulas from F+ to F= (S,≤), as discussed in Section 3.2, when F+ is the perfect Heyting algebra
P↑(S) rather than the perfect Boolean algebra P(S); however, this interpretation is also coherent with
our understanding of intuitionistic truth as a procedural truth, since, as is well known, if a procedure is
available for establishing that ϕ → ψ is true at a given state s, then at any given evolution of s (including
s itself) it will be possible to use this same procedure to transform a proof of ϕ (whenever available) into
a proof of ψ , and conversely.
Having summarised the salient features of the state-based semantics of intuitionistic logic, the fol-
lowing proposition establishes how it can be seen as a special instance of graph-based semantics.
Proposition 4.1. For any reflexive graph X = (Z,E), if E is transitive (i.e. E is a preorder), then X+ is
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a complete and completely distributive lattice (hence a perfect Heyting algebra).
Proof. It is enough to show that the Galois-stable sets of P+X ⊆P(ZA) (resp. P
+
X ⊆P(ZX)) are exactly
the upward-closed (resp. the downward-closed) subsets. To this end, it is enough to show that Y ↑↓ =
Y↑ := {z ∈ Z | xEz for some x ∈ Y} for any Y ⊆ ZA (or dually, that Y
↓↑ = Y↓ := {z ∈ Z | zEx for some
x ∈ Y} for any Y ⊆ ZX ). Indeed, Y
↑ = {x ∈ ZX | for all a, if a ∈Y then aE
cx} =Y↑c. Then Y ↑↓ = Y↑c↓c.
Given that Y↑ is by definition an upward-closed set, Y↑c is a downward-closed set, hence Y↑c↓ = Y↑c;
hence, Y↑c↓c = Y↑cc = Y↑.
The proposition above shows that the Galois-stability of satisfaction (resp. refutation) sets projects
onto their being ≤-upward (resp. ≤-downward) closed in the intuitionistic setting. This establishes a
tight link between, on the one hand, the transitivity of intuitionistic frames and, on the other, a package
of three characterizing properties of intuitionistic logic, namely persistence of intuitionistic satisfaction,
distributivity of intuitionistic ∧ and ∨, and the relation of refutation coinciding with the one of non-
satisfaction. In the absence of transitivity, all three properties in this package are expected to fail. Indeed,
let us illustrate this fact by considering the reflexive (and antisymmetric but not transitive) graph X =
(Z,E) shown in the left-hand side of the picture below. The polarity drawn in the centre of the picture is
the polarity PX associated with X, and the (nondistributive) lattice on the right is X+ = P
+
X .
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Let us consider a (homomorphic) assignment v : L→ X+ such that v(p) = (z,uv) and v(q) = (u,z). The
following picture shows how this assignment translates into the interpretation of p and q onX. We follow
the convention that for every y ∈ Z and formula ϕ , if y  ϕ then ϕ appears above y, and if y≻ ϕ then ϕ
appears below y.
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The left-hand side of the picture above shows that indeed, the formula q which is true at u becomes first
indeterminate at v and then false at z. Hence, non-distributive satisfaction does not need to be persistent,
and non-distributive refutation is different from non-satisfaction, since v 6 q and v 6≻ q. Together with
the failure of distributivity (which in the example above is yielded by the fact that X+ is nondistributive),
these are the key differences setting apart non-distributive evaluation from intuitionistic evaluation. Their
role in our conceptual interpretation of this semantics will be discussed below. So far, we have discussed
these differences in terms of properties holding in intuitionistic models but failing in graph-based models.
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The following proposition identifies a property holding in graph-based models. We will refer to it asweak
persistence.
Proposition 4.2. For every (reflexive) graph X = (Z,E) any L-formula ϕ , any z,z′ ∈ Z and any homo-
morphic assignment v : L→ X+, if zEz′ and z  ϕ , then z′ 6≻ ϕ .
Proof. By definition, v(ϕ) = ([[ϕ ]],([ϕ ])) ∈ X+, and hence z′ ≻ ϕ iff z′ ∈ ([ϕ ]) = [[ϕ ]]↓ = {z′ ∈ Z | for all
z, if z ∈ [[ϕ ]] then zEcz′}. The assumptions imply that some z ∈ Z exists such that z ∈ [[ϕ ]] and zEz′.
From this proposition it follows that weak persistence projects onto persistence in the intuitionistic
setting: indeed, as shown in the proof of Proposition 4.1, if E is transitive, then [[ϕ ]] = ([ϕ ])c, i.e. z′ 6≻ ϕ
iff z′  ϕ and so, if z  ϕ and zEz′ then z′  ϕ , in every reflexive and transitive graph-based model.
However, as its name suggests, in the wider context of reflexive but not necessarily transitive graph-
based models, weak persistence is strictly weaker than persistence, and hence this notion captures the
difference between intuitionistic and non-distributive evaluation from yet another angle. Namely, in in-
tuitionistic frames, any given state is bound to accept any formula supported by any of its predecessors,
including itself, while in graph-based frames, any given state is only bound to not reject any formula
supported by any of its predecessors, including itself; as discussed above, because of potential inde-
terminacy, not rejecting does not necessarily imply accepting. Hence, together with reflexivity, weak
persistence guarantees that, at any given state, any given formula cannot be both accepted and rejected.
As discussed above, intuitionistic truth can be construed as a procedural truth, so that z  ϕ can be
read e.g. as ‘at z, some finite procedure has effectively established that ϕ is the case’. We also observed
that, in intuitionistic frames, the refutation relation ≻ coincides with the relation 6 of non-satisfaction;
that is, under the previous reading of the intuitionistic satisfaction of a proposition, z ≻ ϕ iff ‘at z, no
finite procedure has effectively established (yet) that ϕ is the case’. Non-distributive truth can be then
construed along these same lines, but requiring an even higher standard8 than intuitionistic truth: for
instance, to conclude that ϕ is refuted at z, the absence of a procedure effectively establishing ϕ is not
enough; one needs there to be a procedure effectively disproving ϕ .
Above, we remarked that, when moving from classical to intuitionistic logic, the interpretation of
→ changes and becomes intensional, in the sense that the truth value of p→ q at a given state s does
not just depend on the value of p and q at that state, but also on the truth values of p and q at the ≤-
successors of s. Similarly, in moving from the intuitionistic to the non-distributive setting, conjunction
and disjunction become “intensional” in the same sense, i.e. that the satisfaction of p∨ q (and dually,
the refutation of p∧ q) at a given state s does not just depend on the value of p and q at that state, but
also on the truth values of p and q at the E-successors of that state. Indeed, under the assignment above,
v(p∨q)= (uvz,∅). The following picture shows how this assignment translates as satisfaction/refutation
of p∨q at states of X.
8For the sake of the telescopic progression of this presentation, we have discussed a possible interpretation of non-
distributive evaluation which allows it to be described as being stricter than the intuitionistic one. However, other readings
might suggest that it is just different: for instance, one can read z  ϕ as ‘z provides an argument/evidence supporting ϕ’,
and z≻ ϕ as ‘z provides an argument/evidence against ϕ’. The essential difference lies in the fact that, in the non-distributive
setting,  and ≻ determine each other in a way that is defined in terms of E, and, in contrast to the intuitionistic setting, cannot
be simply reduced to identifying one with the complement of the other.
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In the example above, p∨q is true at state v although neither p nor q are. More specifically, p is false at
v and q is neither true nor false. Indeed, the defining clauses of ≻ and  for ∨-formulas (cf. discussion
in Section 3.2), repeated below for the reader’s convenience,
z≻ ϕ ∨ψ iff z≻ ϕ and z≻ ψ z ϕ ∨ψ iff for all z′, if zEz′ then z′ 6≻ ϕ ∨ψ
z  ϕ ∧ψ iff z ϕ and z  ψ z≻ ϕ ∧ψ iff for all z′, if zEz′ then z′ 6 ϕ ∧ψ
can be understood as saying that a ∨-formula (resp. ∧-formula) is refuted (resp. satisfied) at a state iff
both immediate subformulas are refuted (resp. satisfied) at that state (which is verbatim the intuitionistic
and even the classical refutation condition for ∨-formulas and satisfaction condition for ∧-formulas), and
that a ∨-formula (resp. ∧-formula) is satisfied (resp. refuted) at a given state iff none of its successors
(including itself) refutes (resp. satisfies) it, i.e. none of its successors refutes (resp. satisfies) both its
immediate subformulas. The case of disjunction in the example above is then clear-cut: there is no state
which refutes both p and q, and hence the satisfaction condition of p∨q is vacuously verified by all states
of the graph above. However, to mark the difference with the distributive interpretation of disjunction,
p∨ q is still true at v even if: (a) the falsehood of p is positively established at v; (b) at v, the truth of q
can be excluded, given that v does not access any state at which q is true, and (c) at v, the falsehood of q
cannot be excluded, given that v accesses a state at which q is false.
Below, we discuss some possible conceptual interpretations of the graph-based semantics which will
account for the intensional meaning of ∨ in a hyper-constructivist context in which effective procedures
are needed both for accepting and for rejecting a proposition.
Reflexive graphs and the inherent bounds of knowability. In [14], it is argued that, based on their
graph-based semantics, LE-logics can be taken as the logics of informational entropy, where informa-
tional entropy is understood as an inherent boundary to knowability due e.g. to perceptual, theoretical,
technological, evidential or linguistic limits. The starting point of this interpretation is to regard reflex-
ive graphs X= (Z,E) in analogy with approximation spaces (cf. discussion in penultimate paragraph of
Section 4.1), and hence to regard E as an indiscernibility relation9. However, while indiscernibility is
modelled as an equivalence relation in the best known settings in rough set theory and epistemic logic
(e.g. [60, 29] [60]), transitivity fails in concrete instances in which e.g. states are indiscernible when
their distance is closer than a certain threshold, and, as it has been argued in the psychological literature
(cf. [67, 57]), symmetry fails in situations in which indiscernibility is defined in terms of a relation of
similarity where e.g. z being similar to z′ does not necessarily imply that z′ is similar to z. Hence, under
this broader understanding, reflexivity, i.e. ∆ ⊆ E , is the minimal requirement of an indiscernibility rela-
tion10. The limit case in which E := ∆ is the (classical) case in which there are no boundaries to perfect
knowability. So, the generalization from the classical to the non-distributive propositional environment
is captured by the graph-based semantics as the logical internalization of the shift from ∆ to E .
9In what follows, we propose that zEz′ can be sometimes interpreted as z is consistent with z′, or z does not exclude z′.
10These objections to modelling indiscernibility as an equivalence relation have also been addressed in rough set theory and
epistemic logic, see e.g. [70, 3]
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As discussed above, rather than generating modal operators (e.g. upper and lower approximations, as
in rough set theory), E is used to generate the complete lattice X+ as the concept lattice of the polarity
PX = (ZA,ZX , IEc), the elements of which are the closures of subsets of Z (representing states of affairs)
under all is knowable about them, i.e. the theoretical horizon to knowability, given the inherent boundary
encoded into E .
As discussed above about the persistence property of intuitionistic satisfaction, in the non-distributive
setting, the requirement of Galois-stability is not only mathematically justified by the need of defining
a compositional semantics for L, but can also be understood at a more fundamental level: if E encodes
an inherent limit to knowability, this limit should be incorporated in the meaning of formulas which are
both satisfied and refuted ‘up to E’, i.e. the semantic representation of each formula should not be given
in terms of arbitrary subsets of the domain of the graph, but only in terms of those subsets which are
preserved (i.e. faithfully translated) in the shift from ∆ to E; these are exactly the Galois-stable sets. In
particular, the closure a↑↓ of any a ∈ Z arises by first considering the set a↑ of all the states from which
a is not indiscernible, and then the set of all the states that can be told apart from every state in a↑. Then
a is clearly an element of a↑↓, but other states b in Z might be as well, so this is as far as we can go: a↑↓
represents the horizon, defined in terms of E , to the possibility of completely ‘knowing’ a. This horizon
might be epistemic, cognitive, technological, or evidential. Under this understanding of E , the following
defining clauses of ≻ and  for ∨-formulas (cf. discussion in Section 3.2)
z≻ ϕ ∨ψ iff z≻ ϕ and z≻ ψ z  ϕ ∨ψ iff for all z′, if zEz′ then z′ 6≻ ϕ or z′ 6≻ ψ
reflect a kind of conservative or cautious interpretation of the meaning of∨: indeed, if states of a reflexive
graphs represent e.g. epistemic situations, or hypothetical scenarios or alternative theories, then a given
scenario s refutes a ∨-formula iff that scenario (contains enough evidence or explanatory power so that it)
can refute both disjuncts; however, if no scenario that can be accessed from s (contains enough evidence
so that it) can refute both disjuncts, then s must accept the given ∨-formula.
Concrete examples in which this interpretation of ∨ is arguably closer to reality than the classical or
intuitionistic one arise e.g. in legal domains. Consider for instance the Rashomon-type story of a judge
who is to establish whether a (female) defendant is to be declared not guilty of the physical injuries
sustained by a (male) friend of hers. To simplify matters, the defendant is not guilty if and only if
p∨ q, where p stands for ‘the defendant has not willingly caused harm to her friend’ and q stands for
‘the defendant acted in self-defence’. In the trial, three witnesses testify as follows: Witness A: “I saw
the defendant grabbing a tennis racket and hitting her friend. She looked terrified and didn’t utter a
sound.” Witness B: “I saw the defendant grabbing a tennis racket and hitting her friend. She looked
frightened, but not necessarily by her friend.” Witness C: “I heard the defendant scream that there was a
poisonous spider on her friend’s shoulder, so she killed the spider.” The following graph summarizes the
information gathered by the judge:
zA
q
p
zB
p
zC
p
q
The states of the graph above represent the different testimonies of the three witnesses; the arrows repre-
sent the accessibility relation among states, where e.g. zAEzB means ‘A’s testimony is consistent with B’s
testimony’, and zBEzC means ‘B’s testimony is consistent with C’s’ (notice, however, that zB is arguably
not consistent with zA, since the evidence brought by zB challenges the conclusions that can be drawn on
the base of the evidence brought by zA, and by the same argument, zC is not consistent with zB). Finally,
zA and zC are mutually inconsistent, since they challenge each other’s evidence, and each testimony is
consistent with itself. Witness A’s testimony offers evidence against p (A saw the defendant hitting her
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friend with a tennis racket) and evidence supporting q (she was frightened); Witness B’s testimony offers
evidence against p (B too saw the defendant hitting her friend with a tennis racket) while not offering any
evidence in support of or against q (according to B, she might or might not have been frightened by her
friend); Witness C’s testimony offers evidence against q and supporting p. The judge is not in a position
to establish whether the witnesses are lying or not, or which witness is right; however, the judge’s task
is to decide on p∨ q on the basis of the available pieces of evidence and how these pieces fit with each
other. There is no witness that provides enough evidence to refute both p and q, hence, no matter how
different their versions are, all testimonies lead to the acceptance of a not guilty verdict.
LE-logics as epistemic logics of information entropy. In Section 4.1, the first proposal we discussed
of an informal understanding of the modal operators on polarity-based semantics was epistemic, and was
based on the possibility of taking the incidence relation I of any polarity as objectively encoding which
objects have which features, while, in contrast, the relations R and R♦ were understood as representing
the subjective perspective of e.g. an agent on the same issues. Likewise, as discussed in [14], in the
graph-based setting, additional relations on graphs-based frames can be regarded as encoding subjective
indiscernibility, i.e. zRy can be understood as ‘z is indiscernible from y according to a given agent’,
as opposed to the objective, or inherent indiscernibility encoded by E . Under this interpretation, the
following defining clauses of ≻ and  for -formulas and ♦-formulas (cf. discussion in Section 3.3),
z≻ ♦ϕ iff for all z′, if zR♦z
′ then z′ 6 ϕ z ♦ϕ iff for all z′, if zEz′ then z′ 6≻ ♦ϕ
z ψ iff for all z′, if zRz
′ then z′ 6≻ ψ z≻ψ iff for all z′, if z′Ez then z′ 6ψ
can be understood as saying that ϕ is satisfied at a given state if no state that the agent considers
indistinguishable from the given one refutes ϕ , and ♦ϕ is refuted at a given state if no state that the agent
considers indistinguishable from the given one accepts ϕ . Hence, under the interpretation indicated
above, these semantic clauses support the usual reading of ϕ as ‘the agent knows/believes ϕ’ and ♦ϕ
as ‘the agent considers ϕ plausible’.
In Section 4.1, we argued that the epistemic interpretation of in the polarity-based semantics carries
to the preservation of the meaning of well known epistemic principles. Let us now finish this section
by discussing that, also in the setting of graph-based semantics, the epistemic interpretation of modal
operators coherently preserves the meaning of the same epistemic principles. In [14, Proposition 4]), the
first-order correspondents of well known modal axioms from epistemic logic have been computed, which
turn out to be the parametrized ‘E-counterparts’ of the first-order correspondents on Kripke frames.
That is, the factivity axiom ϕ ⊢ ϕ , which, on classical Kripke frames corresponds to reflexivity (∆ ⊆
R), corresponds to the first-order condition E ⊆ R on graph-based frames, which in [14] is referred
to as E-reflexivity; the omniscience axiom ϕ ⊢ ϕ , which, on classical Kripke frames corresponds to
the first-order condition R ⊆ ∆, corresponds to its E-counterpart R ⊆ E on graph-based frames; the
positive introspection axiom ϕ ⊢ ϕ , which, on classical Kripke frames corresponds to transitivity
(R ◦R ⊆ R), corresponds to the first-order condition R •E R ⊆ R on graph-based frames
11 which
in [14] is referred to as E-transitivity. So it seems possible to capture the shift from ∆ to E also at the
level of the first-order correspondents, by establishing a sort of systematic replacement of the role of ∆
with E .12 This similarity in shape is also what guarantees that the intended meaning of the epistemic
principles is preserved in the translation from ∆ to E . Indeed, as discussed in [14], the E-reflexivity
condition E ⊆ R requires that if the agent is able to distinguish two given states, then these states
are not inherently indistinguishable. That is, the agent’s assessments are correct, which preserves the
11For any graph X= (Z,E) and relations R,S⊆ Z×Z, the relation R•E S⊆ Z×Z is defined as follows: for any a,x ∈ Z,
a(R•E S)x iff ∃y(aRy& ∀b(bEy⇒ bSx)).
If E = ∆, then {b | bEy} = {y} for every y ∈ Z, hence (R•E S) reduces to R◦S.
12Mutatis mutandis, the same phenomenon is observable in the polarity-based setting. More about this in the conclusions.
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meaning of factivity modulo informational entropy. Similarly, the condition R ⊆ E requires the agent
to be able to distinguish any two states that are not inherently indistinguishable, which is indeed what
an omniscient (but not all-powerful) agent should be able to do. Finally, the condition R •E R ⊆ R,
i.e. ∀a∀x [∃y(aRy& ∀b(bEy⇒ bRx))⇒ aRx] requires that if the agent cannot distinguish y from a
and x from any state from which y is inherently indistinguishable, then she cannot distinguish x from
a. Equivalently, if the agent can distinguish x from a, then (x does not belong to the set Y of states
indistinguishable from a according to the agent, and hence) every state y which belongs to Y must be
inherently indistinguishable from some state b from which she can distinguish x. That is, if x /∈ Y
as above, then for every y ∈ Y the agent must be able to find an ‘E-proxy’ b of y from which she
can tell x apart. Hence, the first-order correspondent of positive introspection on graphs requires that,
if the agent can distinguish x from a, there is a witness b (a ‘justification’) for x to be distinct from
any state that the agent cannot distinguish from a. Similarly to the first-order condition corresponding
to positive introspection on polarities (cf. page 14), this requirement for a justification is indeed what
positive introspection is about.
5 Conclusions and further directions
The present paper discussed ongoing research directions investigating the mathematical theory and con-
ceptual implications of relational (non-topological) semantics for non-distributive logics, with a special
focus on logics which are algebraically captured by varieties of normal lattice expansions in arbitrary
signatures. We showed how, starting from well known adjunctions between (complete) lattices and,
respectively, polarities and reflexive graphs, one can derive relational semantics for the language of lat-
tice logic on both these types of structures. We illustrated how these basic semantic frameworks can
be systematically expanded to accommodate expansions of the language with arbitrary normal connec-
tives. The main point we wished to convey with this discussion was methodological: starting from an
adjunction between a class of relational structures and lattices, one can uniformly obtain a suitable en-
richment of these relational structures to support a systematically derived semantics for LE-logics. This
methodology allows one to treat LE-logics uniformly, so that various proposals and solutions which
were developed for specific signatures (e.g. the Routley-Meyer semantics for substructural logics) can
be systematically connected and extended to other signatures.
Having obtained these relational semantics, one can try and extract from them insights into the nature
of non-distributive logics, much in the way that classical Kripke semantics provides insight into the nature
of modal logics by enabling one to reason about possibility and necessity in terms of possible worlds.
As we saw, the failure of distributivity is born out by both the polarity-based and graph-based semantics,
which offer different perspectives on this phenomenon. The polarity-based semantics builds on insights
from formal concept analysis, seeing polarities as abstract databases of objects and features, and gives
rise to an interpretation of LE-logics where formulas act as names for formal concepts. Under this
interpretation, the logical connectives ∧ and ∨ come to stand, not for counterparts of the natural language
conjunction (‘and’) and disjunction (‘or’), but rather for operations returning, respectively, the greatest
common sub-concept and least common super-concept of the concepts named by their arguments. This
interpretation allows to intuitively understand the (satisfaction) relation  as ‘being a member’ in a
category, or ‘exemplifying’ a concept, and the (refutation) relation ≻ as ‘being a defining feature of’ the
given category or concept.
On the other hand, graph-based semantics evaluates formulas at states as in Kripke frames, and gives
rise to an intensional interpretation of∧ and ∨, where successor states need to be taken into account in the
evaluation of these connectives. The graph-based semantics supports a reading of ∧ and ∨ which can be
described as a conservative or cautious version of logical conjunction and disjunction, in a type of hyper-
constructivist logic in which the failure of the law of excluded middle happens at the meta-language
level, in the sense that, at any given state, any given formula can be satisfied, refuted or neither.
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Informed by such general insights into the nature(s) of non-distributive logics, these semantic paradigms
can be used to model and reason about more specific phenomena. Regarding polarities as abstract
databases enriched with relations modelling other (e.g. agent specific) types of information, we saw
how non-distributive logics in specific signatures emerge as modal and epistemic logics of formal con-
cepts. Specializing and varying this interpretation allows us to reason about themes and topics in text
databases, syndromes in hospitals, consumer segments within markets, competing scientific theories and
interrogative agendas.
The graph-based semantics is suitable for capturing situations where relations of similarity, proxim-
ity, indistinguishability or other types of relative informational entropy between states play a role. Such
relations encode certain bounds to knowability, inherent in the situation under consideration. These could
be bounds on human perception, like the inability to distinguish between the colours of light frequencies
which are less the two hertz apart, or bounds on the expressiveness of a natural language imposed by re-
lations of synonymy. In this paper we developed an example where the bounds were evidential, and were
encoded by the relation of consistency between a piece of testimony and its conclusions and another
piece of testimony. Here the ‘cautious’ non-distributive disjunction functioned naturally in formulas
expressing the not guilty status of the defendant.
In the present paper, we have only scratched the surface of a wide-ranging and presently ongoing
research programme. Many developments are currently being investigated and will be investigated which
build on the insights, techniques and methodologies presented in this paper. In the following paragraphs
we outline some of the main ones.
Many-valued semantics. The interpretations of graph-based and polarity-based semantics we have
discussed in the present paper generalize very naturally to many-valued versions. Objects in databases
may posses features to a certain extent, rather than absolutely: instead of a word being a keyword of a
document, we might want to know with what frequency it appears in the document and, as accordingly,
a document may be about a topic to a certain extent; members of a selection committee naturally find
some issues more important than others and so the emergent interrogative agendas emphasise some
issues more than others. Similarly, testimonies may be more or less compatible with one another and
may support conclusions or claims to varying extents; there are different proportions of overlap between
the variables featuring in databases constructed to test scientific theories, and the may offer support
hypothesis to a variable extent. In line with these ideas, many valued versions of polarity-based and
graph-based semantics of LE-logics have been proposed (see e.g. [15, 21, 13]) and deserve further study
and development.
Parametricity phenomena. We have illustrated how the semantic frameworks we have introduced
generalize and project onto the standard relational semantics of classical and intuitionistic (modal) logic.
Moreover, we saw how the level in this hierarchy is parametric in—and completely determined by—the
properties of the polarity relation I or the graph relation E . We have also observed how this parametricity
phenomenon extends to the interpretation of modal operators, and particularly in how the (suitably ex-
pressed) frame-properties corresponding to well-known modal axioms generalize by simply substituting
the appropriate relation in containments and compositions. We conjecture that, in a way that will have
to be made suitably precise, this holds for all Sahlqvist and inductive formulas, even when we consider
many-valued versions of the semantics. This conjecture receives support from the fact that, in many-
valued modal logic, all Sahlqvist formulas have verbatim the same first frame-correspondents, albeit with
possibly different many-valued meaning [9]. This suggests that other constructions and metatheorems,
including truth preserving model-constructions and characterizations of expressivity (see [40, 39, 22]),
might also lend themselves to a unified, parametric treatment.
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Vectors space semantics. Throughout the paper, we have particularly stressed the methodological
aspects of our approach, which allow for the systematic introduction of relational semantics for non-
distributive logics using some forms of representation results for lattices (or subclasses thereof) obtained
via dualities or adjunction results. The polarity-based and graph-based semantics discussed in the present
paper are by no means the only structures which lend themselves to the application of this methodology,
which can be extended also beyond non-distributive logics. Another instance of this methodology being
applied is [42], where a relational semantic framework based on vector spaces has been introduced for
the basic (modal) Lambek calculus. Vector-based models are widely used in various areas of computer
science such as computational linguistics [66], information retrieval [64] and machine learning [49],
as outcomes of statistical analyses of large databases. The possibility of regarding these structures as
relational models of (non-distributive) propositional logics offers a concrete route for addressing the
systematic integration of symbolic and sub-symbolic methods in AI.
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A Appendix
A.1 Relational interpretation of additional connectives
In this section we provide more detail on how the defining clauses of the relations  and ≻ on models
based on polarities and reflexive graphs can be retrieved from the algebraic interpretation in complete
LLE-algebras for , ⊳, ⊲ and, in general, for any connective f ∈ F of arity n f and any connective
g ∈ G of arity ng.
We start with the case of polarities. Appealing to Proposition 3.1, we can write v(ψ) =
∧
{x ∈ P+ |
v(ψ) ≤ x} =
∧
{x ∈ P+ | x ≻ ψ}. Since by assumption v is a homomorphism, v(ψ) = P
+
v(ψ) =
P
+
(
∧
{x ∈ P+ | x≻ ψ}), and since P
+
is completely meet-preserving, we have:
v(ψ) =
∧
{P
+
x | x≻ ψ}. (12)
Hence, for any a ∈ A, we have
a ψ iff a≤ v(ψ) definition of  as in (2)
iff a≤
∧
{P
+
x | x≻ ψ} (12)
iff for all x ∈ X , if x≻ ψ then a≤P
+
x definition of
∧
iff for all x ∈ X , if x≻ ψ then aRx, (13)
where we have defined the accessibility relation R ⊆ A×X corresponding to the interpretation of  as
P
+
as follows:
aRx iff a≤
P+x. (13)
Now, using that the set of elements a for a ∈ A are join-generators of P+, we obtain ≻-clause for :
x≻ψ iff v(ψ)≤ x definition of ≻ as in (3)
iff
∨
{a | a≤ v(ψ)} ≤ x a for a ∈ A join-generators of P+
iff for all a ∈ A, if a≤ v(ψ) then a≤ x definition of
∨
iff for all a ∈ A, if a ψ then aIx definition of  as in (2).
Next, we consider ⊳. Since v is a homomorphism, v(⊳ψ) =⊳P
+
v(ψ) =⊳P
+
(
∧
{x ∈ P+ | x≻ ψ}), and
since ⊳P
+
is completely meet-reversing, we have:
v(⊳ψ) =
∨
{⊳P
+
x | x≻ ψ}. (14)
Hence, for any x ∈ X , we have
x≻⊳ψ iff v(⊳ψ)≤ x definition of ≻ as in (3)
iff
∨
{⊳P
+
x′ | x′ ≻ ψ} ≤ x (14)
iff for all x′ ∈ X , if x′ ≻ ψ then ⊳P
+
x′ ≤ x definition of
∨
iff for all x′ ∈ X , if x′ ≻ ψ then xR⊳x
′, (15)
where we have defined the accessibility relation R⊳ ⊆ X ×X corresponding to the interpretation of ⊳ as
⊳P
+
as follows:
xR⊳x
′ iff ⊳P
+
x′ ≤ x. (15)
As the set of elements x for x ∈ X are meet-generators of P+, we obtain the following equivalences:
a ⊳ψ
iff a≤ v(⊳ψ) definition of  as in (2)
iff a≤
∧
{x | v(⊳ψ)≤ x} x for x ∈ X meet-generators of P+
iff for all x ∈ X , if v(⊳ψ)≤ x then a≤ x definition of
∧
iff for all x ∈ X , if x≻⊳ψ then aIx definition of ≻ as in (3).
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Next, we consider ⊲. Since v is a homomorphism, v(⊲ψ) =⊲P
+
v(ψ) =⊲P
+
(
∨
{a ∈ P+ | a  ψ}), and
since ⊲P
+
is completely join-reversing, we have:
v(⊲ψ) =
∧
{⊲P
+
a | a  ψ}. (16)
Hence, for any a ∈ A, we obtain the following:
a⊲ψ iff a≤ v(⊲ψ) definition of  as in (2)
iff a≤
∧
{⊲P
+
a′ | a′  ψ} (16)
iff for all a′ ∈ A, if a′  ψ then a≤⊲P
+
a′ definition of
∧
iff for all a′ ∈ A, if a′  ψ then aR⊲a
′, (17)
where we have defined the accessibility relation R⊲ ⊆ A×A corresponding to the interpretation of ⊲ as
⊲P
+
as follows:
aR⊲a
′ iff a≤⊲P
+
a′. (17)
As the set of elements a for a ∈ A are join-generators of P+, we obtain the following equivalences:
x≻⊲ψ
iff v(⊲ψ)≤ x definition of ≻ as in (3)
iff
∨
{a | a≤ v(⊲ψ)} ≤ x a for a ∈ A join-generators of P+
iff for all a ∈ A, if a≤ v(⊲ψ) then a≤ x definition of
∨
iff for all a ∈ A, if a⊲ψ then aIx definition of  as in (2).
More generally, if f is monotone in its ith coordinate then, by appealing to Proposition 3.1, we write
v(ϕi) =
∨
{a ∈ P+ | a≤ v(ϕi)} =
∨
{a ∈ P+ | a  ϕi}, and if f is antitone in its i-th coordinate then we
write v(ϕi) =
∧
{x ∈ P+ | v(ϕi)≤ x}=
∧
{x ∈ P+ | x≻ ϕi}. Since by assumption v is a homomorphism,
v( f (ϕ)) = f P
+
(v(ϕ)), and so, since f P
+
preserves arbitrary joins in each monotone coordinate and
reverses arbitrary meets in each antitone coordinate, we get
v( f (ϕ)) =
∨
{ f P
+
(
a(n f )
)
| a(n f ) (n f ) ϕ}, (18)
where a(n f ) is a and (n f ) is  if f is monotone in its i-th coordinate, whereas a(n f ) is x and (n f ) is ≻ if
f is antitone in its i-th coordinate. Hence, for any x ∈ X , we obtain the following:
x≻ f (ϕ) iff v( f (ϕ))≤ x definition of ≻ as in (3)
iff
∨
{ f P
+
(
a(n f )
)
| a(n f ) (n f ) ϕ} ≤ x (18)
iff for all a(n f ) ∈ A
(n f )
, if a(n f )  ϕ then f P
+
(a(n f ))≤ x definition of
∨
iff for all a(n f ) ∈ A
(n f ), if a(n f ) (n f ) ϕ then R f (x,a
(n f )) (19).
Here we have defined the accessibility relation R f ⊆ X×A
(n f ), where A
(n f ) denotes the n f -fold cartesian
product of A and X such that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n f if f is monotone in its i-th coordinate then the i-th
coordinate of A
(n f ) is A, whereas if f is antitone in its i-th coordinate then the i-th coordinate of A
(n f ) is
X , corresponding to the interpretation of f as f P
+
as follows:
R f (x,a
(n f )) iff f P
+
(a(n f ))≤ x. (19)
Now, using the fact that the set of elements x for x ∈ X are meet-generators of P+, we can write:
a  f (ϕ)
iff a≤ v( f (ϕ)) definition of  as in (2)
iff a≤
∧
{x | v( f (ϕ))≤ x} x for x ∈ X meet-generators of P+
iff for all x ∈ X , if v( f (ϕ))≤ x then a≤ x definition of
∧
iff for all x ∈ X , if x≻ f (ϕ) then aIx definition of ≻ as in (3).
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If g is monotone in its i-th coordinate then, by Proposition 3.1, we can write v(ϕi) =
∧
{x ∈ P+ |
v(ϕi)≤ x}=
∧
{x ∈ P+ | x≻ ϕi}, and if f is antitone in its i-th coordinate then we write v(ϕi) =
∨
{a ∈
P+ | a≤ v(ϕi)}=
∨
{a∈ P+ | aϕi}. Now, since v is a homomorphism, v(g(ϕ)) = gP
+
(v(ϕ)), and since
gP
+
preserves arbitrary meets in each monotone coordinate and reverses arbitrary joins in each antitone
coordinate, we get:
v(g(ϕ)) =
∧
{gP
+
(
x(ng)
)
| x(ng) ≻(ng) ϕ}, (20)
where x(ng) is x and ≻(ng) is ≻ if g is monotone in its i-th coordinate, whereas x(ng) is a and ≻(ng) is  if
g is antitone in its i-th coordinate. Thus, for any a ∈ A, we obtain the following equivalences:
a g(ϕ) iff a≤ v( f (ϕ)) definition of  as in (2)
iff a≤
∧
{gP
+
(
x(ng)
)
| x(ng) ≻(ng) ϕ} (20)
iff for all x(ng) ∈ X
(ng), if x(ng) ≻ ϕ then a≤ gP
+
(x(ng)) definition of
∧
iff for all x(ng) ∈ X
(ng), if x(ng) ≻(ng) ϕ then Rg(a,x
(ng)) (21).
Here we have defined the accessibility relation Rg ⊆ A×X
(ng), where X
(ng) denotes the ng-fold cartesian
product of A and X such that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ ng if g is monotone in its i-th coordinate then the i-th
coordinate of X
(ng) is X , whereas if g is antitone in its i-th coordinate then the i-th coordinate of X
(ng) is
A, corresponding to the interpretation of g as gP
+
as follows:
Rg(a,x
(ng)) iff a≤ gP
+
(x(ng)). (21)
Since the set of elements a for a ∈ A are join-generators of P+, we can write:
x≻ g(ϕ)
iff v(g(ϕ))≤ x definition of ≻ as in (3)
iff
∨
{a | a≤ v(g(ϕ))} ≤ x a for a ∈ A join-generators of P+
iff for all a ∈ A, if a≤ v(g(ϕ)) then a≤ x definition of
∨
iff for all a ∈ A, if a  g(ϕ) then aIx definition of  as in (2).
Finally, we show how the defining clauses of the relations  and ≻ on models based on graphs can
be retrieved from the algebraic interpretation in complete LLE-algebras for ♦ and . The clauses for ⊳,
⊲, f and g follow by similar arguments.
We first treat ♦. Analogously to the way we argued above, by appealing to Proposition 3.1, we can
write v(ψ) =
∨
{zs ∈X+ | zs≤ v(ψ)}=
∨
{zs ∈X+ | zψ}. Since by assumption v is a homomorphism,
v(♦ψ) =♦X
+
v(ψ) =♦X
+
(
∨
{zs ∈X+ | zψ}), and since ♦X
+
is completely join-preserving, we obtain:
v(♦ψ) =
∨
{♦X
+
zs | z  ψ}. (22)
x≻ ♦ψ iff v(♦ψ)≤ zr definition of ≻ as in (5)
iff
∨
{♦X
+
zs | z  ψ} ≤ zr (22)
iff for all z′ ∈ Z, if z′  ψ then ♦X
+
zs ≤ zr definition of
∨
iff for all z′ ∈ Z, if ♦X
+
zs  zr then z′ 1 ψ contraposition
iff for all z′ ∈ Z, if zR♦z
′ then z′ 1 ψ , (23)
where we have defined the accessibility relation R♦ corresponding to the interpretation of ♦ as ♦
X+ as
follows:
zR♦z
′ iff ♦X
+
zz  zr. (23)
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z  ♦ψ
iff zs ≤ v(♦ψ) definition of  as in (4)
iff zs ≤
∧
{zr | v(♦ψ)≤ zr} zr for z ∈ Z meet-generators of X+
iff for all z′ ∈ Z, if v(♦ψ)≤ zr then zs ≤ zr definition of
∧
iff for all z′ ∈ Z, if z′ ≻ ♦ψ then zIEcz
′ definition of ≻ as in (5).
iff for all z′ ∈ Z, if z′ ≻ ♦ψ then (z,z′) /∈ E definition of IEc
iff for all z′ ∈ Z, if zEz′ then z′ ⊁ ♦ψ contraposition.
Since by assumption v is a homomorphism, v(ψ) = X
+
v(ψ) = X
+
(
∧
{zr ∈ X+ | z ≻ ψ}), and
since X
+
is completely meet-preserving, we have:
v(ψ) =
∧
{X
+
zr | z≻ ψ}. (24)
Hence, for any z ∈ Z, we have
z ψ iff zs ≤ v(ψ) definition of  as in (4)
iff zs ≤
∧
{X
+
zr | z≻ ψ} (24)
iff for all z′ ∈ Z, if z′ ≻ ψ then zs ≤
X+zr definition of
∧
iff for all z′ ∈ Z, if zs X
+
zr then z
′ ⊁ ψ contraposition
iff for all z′ ∈ Z, if zRz
′ then z′ ⊁ ψ (25)
where we have defined the accessibility relation R corresponding to the interpretation of  as 
X+ as
follows:
zRz
′ iff zs 
X+zr. (25)
z≻ψ
iff v(ψ)≤ zr definition of ≻ as in (5)
iff
∨
{zs | zs ≤ v(ψ)} ≤ zr zs for z ∈ Z join-generators of X+
iff for all z′ ∈ Z, if zs ≤ v(ψ) then zs ≤ zr definition of
∨
iff for all z′ ∈ Z, if z′ ψ then z′IEcz definition of  as in (4).
iff for all z′ ∈ Z, if z′ ψ then (z′,z) /∈ E definition of IEc
iff for all z′ ∈ Z, if z′Ez then z′ 1ψ contraposition.
A.2 Polarity-based frames
In this subsection we give the definition of a polarity-based frame, as well as a suitable expanded adjunc-
tion based on the adjunction between complete lattices and polarities described in Section 3.1. We will
focus mainly on the treatment of the additional connectives.
Before we give the definition of a polarity-based frame, we introduce some notation. For any sets
A,B and any relation S⊆ A×B, we let, for any A′ ⊆ A and B′ ⊆ B,
S(1)[A′] := {b ∈ B | ∀a(a ∈ A′⇒ aSb)} and S(0)[B′] := {a ∈ A | ∀b(b ∈ B′⇒ aSb)}.
For all sets A,B1, . . .Bn, and any relation S ⊆ A×B1×·· ·×Bn, for any C := (C1, . . . ,Cn) where Ci ⊆ Bi
and 1≤ i≤ n we let, for all A′,
C
i
:= (C1, . . . ,Ci−1,Ci+1, . . . ,Cn)
C
i
A′ := (C1 . . . ,Ci−1,A
′,Ci+1, . . . ,Cn)
WhenCi := {ci} and A
′ := {a′}, we will write c for {c}, and c i for {c}
i
, and c ia′ for {c}
i
{a′}. We also let:
1. S(0)[C] := {a ∈ A | ∀b(b ∈C⇒ aSb)}.
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2. Si ⊆ Bi×B1×·· ·×Bi−1×A×Bi+1×·· ·×Bn be defined by
(bi,c
i
a) ∈ Si iff (a,c) ∈ S.
3. S(i)[A′,C
i
] := S
(0)
i [C
i
A′].
Definition A.1. A polarity-based frame for LLE is a tuple F = (P,RF ,RG ), where P = (A,X , I) is a
polarity, RF = {R f | f ∈F}, and RG = {Rg | g ∈ G }, such that for each f ∈F and g ∈ G , the symbols
R f and Rg respectively denote (n f +1)-ary and (ng+1)-ary relations on P,
R f ⊆ X ×A
(n f )
and Rg ⊆ A×X
(ng),
where A
(n f )
denotes the n f -fold cartesian product of A and X such that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n f if f is
monotone in its i-th coordinate then the ith coordinate of A
(n f )
is A, whereas if f is antitone in its i-th
coordinate then the ith coordinate of A
(n f )
is X, and X
(ng)
denotes the ng-fold cartesian product of A and
X such that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ ng if g is monotone in its i-th coordinate then the i-th coordinate of X
(ng)
is X, whereas if g is antitone in its i-th coordinate then the i-th coordinate of X
(ng)
is A. In addition, all
relations R f and Rg are required to be compatible, i.e. the following sets are assumed to be Galois-stable
for all a ∈ A, x ∈ X, a ∈ A(n f ), and x ∈ X (ng):
R
(0)
f [a] and R
(i)
f [x,a
i] R
(0)
g [x] and R
(i)
g [a,x
i].
Definition A.2. For a complete lattice expansion A = (L,FL,G L), the LLE-frame associated with
A is the structure FA = (PL,RF ,RG ), where PL is the polarity (L,L,≤), RF = {R f | f ∈ F}, and
RG = {Rg | g ∈ G }, such that for each f ∈F and g ∈ G , the relations R f and Rg are defined as follows:
R f (x,a
(n f )) iff f P
+
L (a(n f ))≤ x Rg(a,x
(ng)) iff a≤ gP
+
L (x(ng)).
Proposition A.3. For a complete lattice expansion A= (L,FL,G L), the associated LLE-frame FA is a
polarity-based frame.
The complex algebra of a polarity-based frame F= (P,RF ,RG ) for LLE is the algebra
F+ = (L,{ fR f | f ∈F},{gRg | g ∈ G }),
where L := P+, and for all f ∈F and all g ∈ G , we let
1. fR f : L
n f → L be defined by the assignment fR f (c) =
((
R
(0)
f [[[c]]
(n f )
]
)↓
,R
(0)
f [[[c]]
(n f )
]
)
;
2. gRg : L
ng → L be defined by the assignment gRg(c) =
(
R
(0)
g [([c])
(ng)
],
(
R
(0)
g [([c])
(ng)
]
)↑)
.
Here [[c]]
(n f )
denotes the n f -tuple of [[c]] and ([c]) such that for each 1≤ i≤ n f if f is monotone in its i-th
coordinate then the i-th coordinate of [[c]]
(n f )
is [[c]], whereas if f is antitone in its i-th coordinate then
the ith coordinate of [[c]]
(n f )
is ([c]), and ([c])
(ng)
denotes the ng-tuple of [[c]] and ([c]) such that for each
1≤ i≤ ng if g is monotone in its i-th coordinate then the i-th coordinate of [[c]]
(n f )
is ([c]), whereas if g is
antitone in its i-th coordinate then the i-th coordinate of ([c])
(ng)
is [[c]].
Proposition A.4 (cf. [41] Proposition 21). If F = (P,RF ,RG ) is a polarity-based frame for LLE, then
F+ = (L,{ fR f | f ∈F},{gRg | g ∈ G }) is a complete lattice expansion.
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A.3 Graph-based frames
Here we define a graph-based frame and give a suitable expanded adjunction based on the adjunction
between lattices and graphs described in Section 3.1.
For any sets A,B and any relation S ⊆ A×B, we let, for any A′ ⊆ A and B′ ⊆ B,
A[1][A′] := {b | ∀a(a ∈ A′ ⇒ aScb)} S[0][B′] := {a | ∀b(b ∈ B′⇒ aScb)}13.
Hence, S[1][A′] = (Sc)(1)[A′] and S[0][B′] = (Sc)(0)[B′]. More generally, for all sets A,B1, . . .Bn, and any
relation S⊆ A×B1×·· ·×Bn, for any C := (C1, . . . ,Cn) where Ci ⊆ Bi and 1≤ i≤ n we let, for all A
′,
S[0][C] := {a ∈ A | ∀b(b ∈C⇒ aScb)} S[i][A′,C
i
] := S
[0]
i [C
i
A′].
Definition A.5. A graph-based frame forLLE is a tuple F=(X,RF ,RG ), whereX=(Z,E) is a reflexive
graph, RF = {R f | f ∈F}, and RG = {Rg | g ∈ G }, such that for each f ∈F and g ∈ G , the symbols
R f and Rg respectively denote (n f + 1)-ary and (ng + 1)-ary relations on PX satisfying the following
compatibility conditions: for all z′ ∈ Z, z′′ ∈ Zn f and z′′′ ∈ Zng ,
(R
[0]
g [z
′′′])[10] ⊆ R
[0]
g [z
′′′] (R
[1]
g [z
′,z i])[01] ⊆ R
[1]
g [z
′,z i]
(R
[0]
f [z
′′])[10] ⊆ R
[0]
f [z
′′] (R
[i]
f [z
′,z i])[01] ⊆ R
[i]
f [z
′,z i].
Definition A.6. The associated LLE-frame of any lattice expansion A= (L,FL,G L) is defined by FA=
(XL,RF ,RG ), where XL is defined as in Section 3.1, RF = {R f | f ∈ F}, and RG = {Rg | g ∈ G },
such that for each f ∈F and g ∈ G , the relations R f and Rg are defined as follows:
R f (z,z) iff f
X+(zs
(n f )) zr Rg(z,z) iff zs  g
X+(zr
(ng)),
where the i-th component of zs
(n f ) is zs is (zr) if f is monotone (antitone) in its i-th argument, and the
i-th component of zr
(ng) is zr (zs) if g is monotone (antitone) in its i-th argument.
Proposition A.7. The associated LLE-frame FA of any lattice expansion A = (L,FL,G L) is a graph-
based frame.
The complex algebra of a graph-based frame F = (X,RF ,RG ) is the algebra F+ = (L,{ fR f | f ∈
F},{gRg | g ∈ G }), where L := P
+
X , and for all f ∈F and all g ∈ G , we let
1. fR f : L
n f → L be defined by the assignment fR f (c) =
((
R
[0]
f [[[c]]
(n f )
]
)[0]
,R
[0]
f [[[c]]
(n f )
]
)
;
2. gRg : L
ng → L be defined by the assignment gRg(c) =
(
R
[0]
g [([c])
(ng)
],
(
R
[0]
g [([c])
(ng)
]
)[1])
.
As before [[c]]
(n f )
denotes the n f -tuple of [[c]] and ([c]) such that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n f if f is monotone in
its i-th coordinate then the i-th coordinate of [[c]]
(n f )
is [[c]], whereas if f is antitone in its i-th coordinate
then the i-th coordinate of [[c]]
(n f )
is ([c]), and similarly for ([c])
(ng)
.
Proposition A.8. If F = (X,RF ,RG ) is a graph-based frame for LLE, then F+ = (P
+
X ,{ fR f | f ∈
F},{gRg | g ∈ G }) is a complete lattice expansion.
13We will sometimes abbreviate E [0][X ] and E [1][Y ] as X [0] and Y [1], respectively, for each X ,Y ⊆ Z. If X = {x} and Y = {y},
we write x[0] and y[1] for {x}[0] and {y}[1], and write X [01] and Y [10] for (X [0])[1] and (Y [1])[0], respectively. Notice that X [0] = X↓
and Y [1] = Y ↑, where the maps (·)↓ and (·)↑ are those associated with the polarity PX.
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